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SOCKING IT TO PLAINTIFFS: SUPREME COURT
ANTITRUST DECISIONS IN THE 1976-77 TERM
Jeff Miles*
Those persons who delve into the sometimes esoteric and some-
times shockingly practical world of the antitrust laws have noticed
a markedly increased emphasis on both private and public enforce-
ment efforts in recent years. One need look no further than the
attacks against groups once thought to be immune, I action by Con-
gress, 2 and substantially increased state enforcement 3 to see a vigor-
B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1968; M.A., 1971; J.D., Wash-
ington & Lee University, 1973. Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Unit, Commonwealth
of Virginia. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Virginia Office of Attorney General.
1. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (application of antitrust
laws to professionals and a state agency).
2. Some of the more important congressional activity during the proceeding three years
includes Act of Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970)), which increased violation of the Sherman Act from a misdemeanor to a felony and
penalties from $50,000 to $1,000,000 in the case of a corporation, or $100,000 for other persons
and imprisonment from one year to three years; the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-145, §§ 2-4, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1970)), which
repealed authorization for state laws allowing "fair trade" vertical price fixing agreements;
and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383. Title I grants the Antitrust Division broad civil precomplaint discovery and investiga-
tory powers. Title II provides that the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission
must be notified of proposed mergers involving companies in which one has net sales or total
assets of $100,000,000 or more and the other, $10,000,000 or more. Title Im contains the so-
called parens patriae provisions, which grant to states attorneys general standing to bring
suits for Sherman Act violations on behalf of the states' citizens.
For an excellent discussion of antitrust related legislation enacted or considered during the
94th Congress, see Shenefield & Hartwell, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments 1975-
76, 34 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 7 (1977).
3. Indications of increased antitrust enforcement efforts at the state level come from many
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ous movement to assure that no violation goes unnoticed and un-
punished, and that private parties are compensated three-fold for
injuries suffered by reason of illegal anticompetitive activity.
If, however, a person unfamiliar with this background did nothing
more than examine antitrust cases decided by the Court during its
1976-77 term, he would conclude that antitrust problems should be
of little concern. For if a major league batter were to average the
same as plaintiffs did in this term, he would find himself back
washing cars in his hometown rather quickly. Notwithstanding this,
antitrust continues to be one of the most rapidly growing and fastest
changing areas of law today.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TERM
Six cases involving antitrust issues were decided by the Court,
and the plaintiff lost the antitrust question in all. Each case was a
private action; no enforcement actions by the Department of Justice
or Federal Trade Commission were heard. If divided on the basis of
the general issue presented for determination, the six cases can be
divided conveniently into groups of two. In Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.4 and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,5 the issue
concerned circumstances under which an award of damages is im-
proper, notwithstanding that an antitrust violation was proved and
injury was caused. In Brunswick, the Court held that an award of
damages was not proper where the injury occurred by reason of some
factor other than the anticompetitive harm against which the anti-
trust laws are aimed. Illinois Brick determined that indirect pur-
chasers from price fixers may not recoup whatever damages they
suffer by reason of the violation.
sources. Many states, for example, are improving, or enacting for the first time, state antitrust
laws. Virginia did this in 1974. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 through -9.17 (Cum. Supp.
1977). Both the TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) and ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) now report
extensively on state antitrust matters. Recently, Congress appropriated substantial funds to
be given the states for their antitrust enforcement programs. Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-503, § 116, 90 Stat. 2415 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (Supp. VI 1976)).
For general discussions of state antitrust enforcement and its proper role, see NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT (1974),
and Johnson, The Role of State Antitrust Enforcement in Oregon, 21 ANTITRUST BuLL. 611
(1976).
4. 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (discussed in Part I infra).
5. 97 S.Ct. 2061 (1977) (discussed in Part III infra).
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Two other cases, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona' and Vendo Co. v.
Lektro-Vend Corp.,' dealt with situations of seeming conflict be-
tween federal and state interests. In Bates, the court held that the
state action exemption protected the State Bar of Arizona where a
disciplinary rule promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court and
enforced by the bar was challenged on antitrust grounds.8 Vendo
held that in the specific factual circumstances presented, section 16
of the Clayton Act' was not an exception to the federal Anti-
Injunction Act,10 and therefore, a federal court acting under section
16 should not have enjoined a state proceeding.
The final two cases involved the standard a plaintiff must meet
to prove a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." Both
cases involved vertical relationships'" and, no doubt, will substan-
tially affect the franchising industry. After the Court's decision in
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,'" vertical customer
and territorial restraints, some of which had been judged violative
of the antitrust laws under the per se rule, are not necessarily per
se illegal. And in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises,
Inc., 4 the Court made clear that existence of economic power in the
market for the tying product, which is necessary before a tie-in is
per se illegal, is not a foregone conclusion.
From this brief synopsis, it can be seen that several of the cases
6. 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977). Bates involved a first amendment issue, also. See infra, at Part
V.
7. 97 S.Ct. 2881 (1977) (discussed in Part VI infra).
8. Although the persons challenging the disciplinary rule were not plaintiffs since the
matter was commenced by a bar disciplinary proceeding against them, their argument that
the restraint was not protected by the state action exemption usually would be raised by a
plaintiff.
9. Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), confers standing on a person
threatened with injury by violation of the antitrust laws to bring an action for injunctive
relief.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). See note 164 infra, and accompanying text, at Part VI.
11. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), provides in pertinent part that
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal."
12. A vertical relationship is one between entities at different levels in the chain of distribu-
tion, e.g., an agreement between vendor and vendee, as contrasted to a horizontal relation-
ship, which is between competitors.
13. 97 S.Ct. 2549 (1977).
14. 97 S.Ct. 861 (1977) (discussed in Part V infra).
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will have substantial ramifications on private efforts to assure a
competitive economy, and not unimportantly, availability of re-
dress for injuries sustained. It is to these cases and some of their
ramifications that we now turn.
11. WHEN Is THERE AN "INJURY"?
Section 7 of the Clayton Act"5 proscribes acquisitions, the effect
of which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly" in any market. It is an "incipiency" statute,
intended to invalidate acquisitions before their anticompetitive
harms are felt." Thus, no present actual anticompetitive effects
need be shown to prove a violation.'7
Section 4 of the Clayton Act'" provides that persons injured by
reason of an antitrust violation may sue for three times their actual
damages. A seemingly simple question is whether a private plaintiff
is entitled to damages before the anticompetitive effects of an ac-
quisition violative of section 7 are felt.
The answer would seem to be an obvious no, because if there are
no anticompetitive effects, there is no injury. What, however, if a
competitor is injured, not because of any anticompetitive effect of
the acquisition, but because of some other factor which would not
have occurred but for the illegal acquisition? In fact, assume that
at present, the acquisition is procompetitive. Is not the injury still
caused by something "forbidden in the antitrust laws," as required
by section 4?
This question was the subject of the Court's first antitrust deci-
sion of 1977, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.'" During
the "go-go" years of bowling in the 1950's, Brunswick, one of the two
largest manufacturers of bowling equipment in the country, made
15. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
16. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
17. Other antitrust statutes which apply to incipient violations include section 3 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), which prohibits certain exclusive dealing arrangements
and tie-in agreements involving the sale of goods; and section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), which prohibits certain
price discriminations.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
19. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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substantial sales of equipment on credit to bowling centers. The
balloon burst in the 1960's, however, and when its customers de-
faulted on their sales contracts, Brunswick acquired a number of
them to minimize its losses. Six of the centers acquired by Bruns-
wick were in geographic areas where Treadway Companies, owner
of the Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, operated competing centers.
Treadway, on behalf of the centers operated by it, sued, charging
that the acquisitions violated section 7, and requested injunctive
relief, divestiture by Brunswick of the acquired centers, and treble
damages."0 The crux of the case centered on the Treadway theory
of damages. It argued that but for the acquisitions by Brunswick,
the acquired centers would have failed, and the business of Tread-
way centers would have increased. Thus, it argued that the "mere
presence" of Brunswick in the market, a result of the allegedly
illegal acquisitions, had injured Treadway's business."
Brunswick argued in defense,22 first, that the acquisitions were
procompetitive, and therefore, could not be violative of section 7;
second, that even if the acquisitions were otherwise unlawful, the
"failing company" defense was applicable to avoid invalidity; 3 and
third, that even if the acquisitions were unlawful, its "mere pres-
ence" in the market did not justify damages.
A jury found for Treadway on its section 7 claim, and Brunswick's
20. Treadway also claimed that Brunswick violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by fixing
the resale price at which goods sold to Treadway centers were sold to the public, and that it
monopolized the bowling center market in violation of section 2. The section 1 claim was
abandoned prior to trial; the section 2 claim was tried and lost by Treadway.
21. The facts of the case and theories used by each party are most clearly explained in the
Third Circuit's opinion on appeal. NBO Indus. Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d
262 (3d Cir. 1975).
22. See Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 364 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1973).
23. The failing company defense holds that an acquisition otherwise illegal is permitted
where the acquired corporation is on the brink of bankruptcy with little chance of rehabilita-
tion, and the acquiring firm has attempted to find other purchasers, whose acquisition would
not violate section 7. See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549
(1971).
As Professor Areeda has noted, the Treadway theory of damage, i.e., that but for the
acquisitions, the centers would have disappeared, seems inconsistent with a violation of
section 7; for if the competitors would have disappeared then the failing company defense
would have been proved by the plaintiff itself. Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage
Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. Rxv. 1127, 1132-33 n.34 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Areeda]. See
note 24 infra.
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motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was overruled. 4 A
subsequent order of the court required Brunswick to divest itself of
the centers.2s
The Third Circuit affirmed that section 7 had been violated, and
that damages were proper under Treadway's "mere presence"
theory. Because, however, of erroneous instructions, the case was
remanded; 21 divestiture, it held, was not warranted.27
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the
24. 364 F. Supp. at 320. The court also overruled the failing company defense because there
was some doubt that the centers would have gone out of business, and there was almost no
proof that Brunswick had attempted to find another purchaser.
25. Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 389 F. Supp. 996 (D.N.J. 1974).
The acquisitions by Brunswick were vertical, i.e., between corporations at different levels
in the chain of distribution. The major anticompetitive effect of vertical mergers against
which section 7 protects is market foreclosure. Where a manufacturer acquires one of its
customers, competitors of the manufacturer may be foreclosed from selling to that customer,
and competition in the market for the manufacturer's product may be lessened. The potential
effect of this may be to increase the price paid for the manufacturer's product. See, e.g.,
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). A second potentially anticompetitive
effect, and that of particular interest here, is the so-called "deep-pocket theory." Simply
stated, it holds that where a large, financially strong company acquires one of its customers,
it places its resources behind the acquired company and gives the latter a competitive advan-
tage over its competitors. See note 28 infra, for further explanation. Considerations of eco-
nomic efficiencies, however, may dictate the allowance of the merger absent actual or poten-
tial predatory conduct, or actual or potential market foreclosure. It was, however, this second
alleged anticompetitive effect, i.e., entrance by a "deep pocket," upon which Treadway
principally relied to invalidate the merger. Any damages suffered by it under its "mere
presence in the market" damage theory, however, were not a result of either of these anticom-
petitive effects.
Other potentially anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers, none of which are salient here,
are discussed in RUSSELL WARREN, ANTITRUST IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 255 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as WARREN].
26. 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975). The case was remanded because the trial court's instruc-
tions with respect to both whether section 7 was violated and measurement of damages under
section 4 were erroneous.
27. 523 F.2d at 279. The court found that it would be sufficient only to enjoin "those
practices by which a deep pocket market entrant harms competition." Id. Drafting an order
in conformance therewith would be extremely .difficult.
Whether divestiture should be allowed in private section 7 cases has been the subject of
great controversy, and the decisions have split. See International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General
Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975) allowing divestiture, and Fuchs Sugars &
Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 402 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), where divestiture was not
allowed. See generally ABA ANTrrRUST SECTmON, MONOGRAPH No. 1, MERGERS AND THE PRIVATE
ANTITRUST SUIT: THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT at 4-7, 61-63
(1977) [hereinafter cited as MONOGRAPH No. 1].
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jury's verdict of liability based upon the "deep pocket" theory8 and
made clear that private actions for damages were proper for viola-
tion of section 7 .9 The paramount question was whether compensa-
ble "damages were suffered . . . because in the absence of
[Brunswick's] illegal presence the acquired centers would have
gone out of business thus effectively transferring customers to
Treadway's centers."3 The court rejected Brunswick's claim that an
actual foreclosure of competitors or an actual lessening of competi-
tion was necessary before damages were proper, because then the
Treadway companies would have to be driven out of business before
damages accrued. Also rejected was Brunswick's theory that Tread-
way was not damaged because the merger, although violative of
section 7, was procompetitive. Even if the short-run effect was the
enhancement of competition, "[clompetitors, on the other hand,
are injured in their business or property in a short-run period of
predatory competition."3
The Supreme Court unanimously held that Treadway was not
entitled to damages based on its "mere presence" theory. 31 Mr. Jus-
tice Marshall characterized the problem as attempting to construe
28. The court's explanation of the "deep pocket" potential for causing harm was as follows:
The entry of a giant into a market of pygmies certainly suggests the possibility of a
lessening of horizontal retail competition [between the centers acquired by Brunswick
and the Treadway centers]. This is because such a new entrant has greater ease of
entry into the market, can accomplish cost-savings by investing in new equipment, can
resort to low or below cost sales to sustain itself against competition for a longer period,
and can obtain more favorable credit terms.
523 F.2d at 268.
29. Although at first glance this may seem obvious, there are both legal and policy consid-
erations which lend support to the argument that no private damage action for violation of
section 7 should be available. Chief among the arguments is that because section 7 is aimed
at potential harm, there will seldom be any actual injury. See, e.g., Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v.
Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1964). It is accepted now, however, that
private actions for damages are allowable in proper circumstances where, for example, the
threat of injury ripens into reality. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2d
Cir. 1969). See also Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). See generally ABA MONORAPH No. 1, supra note 27, at 7-10,
59-61.
30. 523 F.2d at 268. The only evidence offered by Treadway to prove its damages was an
expert's opinion of what increased profits Treadway centers would have earned had the
centers acquired by Brunswick folded.
31. Id. at 272 (emphasis added). This situation may arise under any incipiency statute.
The problem with the analysis is that here there was little or no evidence of any predation.
32. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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a "prophylactic measure" consistently with a "remedial provi-
sion."" The case presented a conflict between two policies of the
antitrust laws: Allowance of the damage action would serve the
well-recognized purposes of private enforcement and deterrence. On
the other hand, acceptance of the "mere presence" theory would
disserve the policy of providing redress for injuries suffered by the
anticompetitive effects of the violation.
The Court held that Treadway's damage did not constitute
"injury" as used in section 4 because "while [Treadway's] loss
occurred 'by reason of' the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur
'by reason of' that which made the acquisitions unlawful." 34 The
injury would have been suffered even if the acquisition had been
lawful or if a non-"deep pocket" company had acquired the centers.
It held that not only must the plaintiff prove an injury causally
linked to a violation, but it also must prove an "antitrust injury,
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended
to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful. ' 35 Thus, for there to be recovery, the injury must be
caused by the anticompetitive effect of the violation or by anticom-
petitive acts made possible therefrom. 6
The logic of the decision is sound. 7 Windfall recoveries have no
place in antitrust theory. Application of the principle, however, may
be more difficult than its statement, not only in section 7 cases, but
in cases involving other incipiency statutes as well. The decision
also may affect the certification of classes. In Olmstead v. Amoco
Oil Co.," a proposed class action by gasoline retailers alleging tie-
in agreements, the court refused to certify the class because each
dealer would have to testify for the court to determine if his injury
was an "antitrust injury" under the Brunswick standard. 9 We can
expect each damage claim to be closely scrutinized to assure that it
33. Id. at 485.
34. Id. at 488.
35. Id. at 489.
36. The Court upheld the Third Circuit's determination that equitable relief was available,
see note 27 supra, and found it unnecessary to decide whether the failing company defense
was proved. 429 U.S. at 484-85 n.9.
37. See Areeda, supra note 23, at 1133.
38. [1977-11 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 61,487 (M.D. Fla. June 16, 1977).
39. Id. at 71,891.
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arose from some harm at which the antitrust laws are aimed. This
may lead to much new discussion concerning the purposes and
objectives of antitrust enforcement.
The Court has taken a middle ground. On one hand, no actual
lessening of competition need be shown to recover, and plaintiff
need not be driven from the market before "antitrust injur[ies]"
arise." But damages must be the result of the violation's anticompe-
titive effects before damages are proper. 41
1-I. No RECOVERY EVEN WHERE DAMAGES ARE CAUSED BY THE ANTI-
COMPETITIVE EFFECTS
In Brunswick, the plaintiff was unsuccessful because its damages
were not caused by the anticompetitive effect of the antitrust viola-
tions. In the case which, perhaps, is the most devastating to private
antitrust enforcement efforts, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,41 damage
allegedly suffered by the plaintiff clearly was directly attributable
to the classic economic effects of price fixing. Yet recovery of dam-
ages was denied.
The State of Illinois charged Illinois Brick Company and other
manufacturers of concrete block in the Chicago area with fixing the
price of block which subsequently became part of buildings con-
structed for the state.43 The block was sold by the alleged price fixers
40. 429 U.S. at 489 n.14. The Court recognized, however, that "the case for relief will be
strongest where competition has been diminished." Id.
41. The issue presented in Brunswick has been compared to the question of who has
"standing" under section 4. See Areeda, supra note 23, at 1134. The Court noted in Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-63. n.14 (1972) that "Congress did not intend the
antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be
traced to an antitrust violation." The prevalent standing test now, the "target area" test, asks
whether the plaintiff is "within that'area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown
of competitive conditions in a particular industry," Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's,
Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952), or whether the plaintiff,
if injured, was "aimed at" by the defendant, Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d
358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955). The difference between the Brunswick issue and that in standing
cases is that in the latter, injury was a result of the anticompetitive effects against which the
antitrust laws were aimed. More closely related to the standing cases, although still not on
point, is Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S.Ct. 2061 (1977), discussed in Part I infra.
42. 97 S.Ct. 2061 (1977).
43. In April of 1973, the defendants were indicted and subsequently pleaded nolo
contendere to charges of price fixing. See 5 TRADE REG. RE. (CCH) 45,073 at 53,524. A
consent decree terminating the parallel government civil suit was entered in June of 1974.
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to masonry contractors who sold it to a general contractor who sold
the building, including the block, to the state. The state was, there-
fore, an "indirect purchaser" of the block from its manufacturer;
there were two intermediate purchasers. Even though it did not
purchase directly from the alleged price fixers, the state argued that
the anticompetitive effect of the alleged price fix, i.e., a noncompe-
titive overcharge, was "passed-on" through the intermediate pur-
chasers to the state, which bore the brunt of the injury. The question
presented was not whether the state met its burden of showing that
the price increase was passed-on, but whether it would be given the
opportunity to do so, i.e., whether an indirect purchaser is allowed
to recover damages passed-on to him.
The starting point in analyzing this question is the Court's 1968
decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,"
where the issue of passing-on arose in a somewhat different context.
United, a manufacturer of machinery used to produce shoes, had
monopolized the market for shoe machinery." Hanover, a manufac-
turer of shoes and customer of United, brought a private treble
damage action, alleging that United's monopolistic practices had
caused Hanover to pay higher than competitive prices for shoe
machinery. In defense, United argued that any illegal increase in
price had been passed-on by Hanover to its customers and that
Hanover, therefore, had suffered no "legally cognizable injury. 46
The Court rejected the passing-on defense for two basic reasons.
First, the evidentiary problems of proving what amount of damages
were passed-on would be almost insurmountable and would unduly
protract already complicated antitrust suits.47 Second, allowance of
United States v. Ampress Brick Co., [1974-1] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 75,060 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (consent decree).
44. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
45. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
46. 392 U.S. at 487-88. United argued that if Hanover had purchased the machines at a
lower price, it would have charged less for the shoes and, thus, made no more profit than it
actually did.
47. United argued that where the direct purchaser's customers bear an equal overcharge
and where the demand curve for the purchaser's product is almost perfectly inelastic, i.e., a
large increase in price would not decrease demand, and therefore, the overcharge could be
passed-on in full, the direct purchaser would not be damaged within the meaning of section
4 of the Clayton Act. The Court rejected this theory because of its underlying ceteris paribus
[Vol. 12:1
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the defense would lead to less vigorous private enforcement of the
antitrust laws because if the passing-on defense were asserted
against each entity in the chain of distribution who sued, the final
user, often a consumer, would have too little a stake in the matter
to bring an action. The Court did recognize that there could be
situations, such as a preexisting cost-plus contract between the vio-
lator and his customer, where proof problems would not be so diffi-
cult and the defense might be allowed.48
Illinois Brick flip-flopped the question presented in Hanover Shoe
and presented the passing-on theory as an offensive tactic. The
question was whether a plaintiff could recover where any damages
incurred by it were passed through to it by one or more intermediate
purchasers. The answer to this question had been the subject of
varying opinions in the circuits.
Analyzing the question as one of standing 9 under section 4 of the
Clayton Act, the Ninth Circuit in In re Western Liquid Asphalt
Cases"0 held that the basic policy consideration in Hanover Shoe was
to promote strong private enforcement and that this goal would be
served best by allowing recovery by indirect purchasers.5' This pol-
economic assumptions:
We are not impressed with the argument that sound laws of economics required
recognizing this defense. A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies.
Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured
after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact been
different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more buoyant,
or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different price.
Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic world rather than an economist's
hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a company's price will have on its total
sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume of total sales are hard to estimate.
Even if it could be shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the
amount of, the overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had not there-
after declined, there would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating
that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his prices absent the
overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued.
392 U.S. at 493.
For a discussion of both the legal and economic issues of the passing-on defense, see
Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 883 (1975).
48. 392 U.S. at 494.
49. See note 41 supra.
50. 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
51. In analyzing Hanover Shoe, the court said:
Clearly the Court's purpose was to preserve the private antitrust suit and promote
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icy, and the fact that the plaintiffs were in the area which defen-
dants should have forseen would be harmed by the illegal conspir-
acy, combined to mandate that the plaintiffs be given standing. The
court recognized that in offensive passing-on cases there might be a
possibility of multiple recoveries by purchasers at different levels in
the chain of distribution.52 Where, however, purchasers at several
levels in the chain of distribution sued, it felt that procedural rules
were available to assure that the total overcharge was apportioned
or that the defendant would not otherwise pay more than once.-3
The opposite conclusion was reached by the Third Circuit in
Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.4 As
might be expected, whereas the Ninth Circuit emphasized that por-
tion of Hanover Shoe which discussed the importance of treble dam-
age actions in antitrust enforcement, the court in American
Radiator emphasized the complex and difficult evidentiary prob-
lems which allowing the theory would interject into antitrust pro-
ceedings." Although the court recognized that one reason for the
Hanover Shoe result was fear of negating the efficacy of private
compensation to those injured. This purpose could not be achieved with the hindrance
of a defense, the proof of which it felt would normally present "insuperable difficulty,"
but the mere allegation of which would often lengthen antitrust litigation beyond
reasonable bounds.
Id. at 196.
52. The court paid no more than lip service to Hanover Shoe's concern with the com-
plexity of evidence: "Although [plaintiffs] may have difficulty proving damages, our deci-
sion shows that we believe they should have an opportunity to do so." Id. at 200.
53. Id. at 201. The court specifically mentioned compulsory joinder, consolidation, inter-
pleader and the appointment of a master in complex cases. Other protections, according to
the court, include the "short" four year statute of limitations and doctrines of former adjudi-
cation.
54. 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), af'g per curiam Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Because of the per curiam
nature of affirmance, the discussion here is of the district court's "thorough and well-reasoned
opinion." 438 F.2d at 1188.
55. The difficulty was explained as follows:
Assuming that the price paid by the wholesaler to the manufacturer contained an
unlawful overcharge, claims of the present plaintiffs rest, as has been indicated, at the
very least on the following additional premises: (a) that the overcharge was then passed
on by the wholesaler to the plumbing contractor; (b) that the plumbing contractor then
passed the overcharge on to the builder; (c) that the builder passed on the overcharge
to the purchasing homeowner; (d) in the case of used houses, each prior homeowner
passed the overcharge on to the present plaintiffs. Each of these steps represents
activity in a completely new and unrestrained market.
50 F.R.D. at 26.
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damage actions, it dismissed this rationale because the Supreme
Court "laid little stress on this consideration and discussed it very
briefly.""8 No effort was made to interpret the two bases of the
Hanover Shoe decision in a consistent manner.
In Illinois Brick, the district court viewed the issue of offensive
passing-on as one of "whether parties more remote than the direct
purchaser. . . have standing to sue under section 4 of the Clayton
Act."57 After holding that nothing in Hanover Shoe required privity
between the plaintiff and defendant and therefore, that the decision
did not foreclose all indirect purchasers from relief, the court ana-
lyzed which indirect purchasers were in the "target area" for stand-
ing purposes." Finding the state to be an "ultimate consumer," it
held that the state's injury was too remote for it to have standing. 9
The Seventh Circuit reversed.'" Placing reliance on the broad lan-
guage of section 4, i.e., "[a]ny person who shall be injured . . .
shall recover,"'" and the Western Liquid Asphalt decision, it held
that Hanover Shoe "did not enshrine privity as a requirement of
recovery under the antitrust laws," 2 and that the state was within
the target area for standing purposes. American Radiator and Allis-
Chalmers3 were distinguished on the ground that in each, the plain-
56. Id. at 29.
57. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 464 (N.D. 111. 1975).
58. The standing test used by the court was the more liberal standard of Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964),
which asks whether the defendant could reasonably forsee that the plaintiff would be affected
by the violation.
To determine standing, the court divided indirect purchasers into two groups. An
"immediate consumer" was defined as an indirect purchaser who bought the good from the
vendor without the good having been altered. An "ultimate consumer" was defined as one
who bought the good from the middleman in an altered form. In Hanover Shoe, for example,
a customer of Hanover's would be an ultimate consumer.
59. On the other hand, the court held that an immediate consumer would have standing.
The denial of standing to the "ultimate consumer" was based on the Seventh Circuit's
holding in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.
1963), one of the famous Electrical Conspiracy Cases. There, Illinois was denied standing
when it intervened and sought damages for its citizens in a suit by the utility charging the
defendant with fixing the prices of electrical equipment sold to the utility.
60. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976).
61. Id. at 1165, (emphasis added), quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
62. 536 F.2d at 1166.
63. See note 59 supra.
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tiff simply failed to prove that it was damaged by the alleged viola-
tion. 4
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in a six to three
decision. 5 State attorneys general and their staffs, some of whom
have instituted parens patriae suits, and many of whom are in-
volved in multi-district cases where the state was an indirect pur-
chaser, immediately became concerned and with good reason. The
decision will seriously affect the ability of states to enforce vigor-
ously the antitrust laws for the benefit of their citizens, who as
consumers may be subjected to price fixing on goods they buy, and
as taxpayers must bear the effect of price fixing on goods purchased
by the state.
The Court wasted no time in clearing some confusion by putting
to rest the theory that the question was one of standing."6 The issue
framed for determination by the Court was whether under section
4 "the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of
manufacture or distribution, is the party 'injured in his business or
property' within the meaning of the section." 7 Finding Hanover
Shoe to be applicable and meshing the two bases for that decision,
a majority of the Court determined that to allow recovery by indi-
64. This distinction seems weak. In neither American Radiator nor Allis-Chalmers were the
plaintiffs even allowed to prove that the violation injured them. Moreover, in Hanover Shoe
the defense was not allowed, even conceding that portions of the overcharge were passed-on.
Thus, the holding in Hanover Shoe was that the defendant was not allowed to prove the pass-
on, not that he had been given the opportunity and failed.
65. 97 S.Ct. 2061 (1977).
66. 97 S.Ct. at 2066 n.7. Mr. Justice White, speaking for the majority, said:
Because we find Hanover Shoe dispositive here, we do not address the standing issue,
except to note, as did the Court of Appeals below, 536 F.2d. at 1166, that the question
of which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for purposes of § 4 is
analytically distinct from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too
remote to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4.
67. 97 S.Ct. at 2066. The Court realized that it was creating a legal fiction. For example,
its interpretation of Hanover Shoe was that the "antitrust defendant is not permitted to
introduce evidence that indirect purchasers were in fact injured by the illegal overcharge."
97 S.Ct. at 2064 (emphasis added). And the Court phrased the question for determination in
Illinois Brick as "whether the overcharged direct purchaser should be deemed ... to have
suffered the full injury." Id. at 2065 (emphasis added). Finally, the majority concluded, "It
is true that, in elevating direct purchasers to a preferred position as private attorneys general,
the Hanover Shoe rule denies recovery to those indirect purchasers who may have been
actually injured by antitrust violations." Id. at 2075.
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rect purchasers would decrease the effectiveness of private actions
as a mode of antitrust enforcement.
The result was reached in two steps. First, the majority decided
that if passing-on cannot be used as a defense by the defendant, it
should not be used offensively by an indirect purchaser. If applica-
tion were not consistent, the risk of multiple liability would be
tremendous; and although procedural rules exist that diminish the
problem where indirect and direct purchasers sue concurrently,"
there remains a possibility of multiple recoveries where the direct
purchaser has recovered the full amount of the overcharge before the
indirect purchaser sues. The majority refused to adopt the policy of
allowing some multiple of treble damages to be recovered and in-
stead decided that the injuries of some persons must go unre-
dressed." Moreover, the difficulty with theoretical economic evi-
dence seen in Hanover Shoe "applies with no less force to the asser-
tion of pass-on theories by plaintiffs than to the assertion by defen-
dants," 0 and, therefore, the same complexities arise - complexities
which deter efficient private enforcement of the antitrust laws.71
Second, having determined that consistency was necessary
whether or not the pass-on theory was to be heard by courts, the
question became whether to disallow both offensive and defensive
use, or to overrule or modify Hanover Shoe and allow use of the
theory by both sides. Because it felt that overruling Hanover Shoe
would seriously erode the effectiveness of the private treble damage
action, the majority held that neither offensive nor defensive use
68. See note 53 supra. Such mechanisms as consolidation, joinder and interpleader do not
solve the problem if defensive use of passing-on is not allowed.
69. If this one seemingly simple policy consideration had not been adopted, the result
probably would have been entirely different. This was a point of disagreement between the
Court and the Ninth Circuit.
70. 97 S.Ct. at 2068.
71. The majority also rejected Illinois' argument and that of the dissenters that the 1976
parens patriae provisions, section 4C of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15C, and its legislative
history, conclusively showed that indirect purchasers were entitled to recovery. Although
recognizing that Congress thought, in considering section 4C, that there was no bar to recov-
ery by indirect purchasers, the legislators made clear that section 4C did no more than confer
standing on state attorneys general; standing was not the issue in Illinois Brick. Moreover,
since section 4 was enacted some sixty-two years before section 4C, the legislative history of
the latter could not be used to interpret the former. Congress was expressly invited to change
the result if it disagreed. 97 S.Ct. at 2068-69 n.14. See note 81 infra.
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would be allowed. This result was predicated on now familiar fac-
tors: First, the attempt to apportion damages between purchasers
at different levels in the chain of distribution and the economic
evidence which would be necessary would "add whole new dimen-
sions of complexity to treble damage suits."" The purely competi-
tive market, upon which is based the elasticity analysis which deter-
mines what portion of the overcharge is passed on, simply does not
exist. 73 Second, the majority again reiterated its fear of multiple
recoveries .74
The dissenters75 adopted the opposite view of every argument put
forth by the majority. Where the majority argued that Hanover
Shoe had to be applied consistently to offensive and defensive use
of passing-on, the dissent saw no need for consistency. Emphasizing
that part of Hanover Shoe which extolled the private action and the
incentive for its use, the dissent argued that offensive use of the
theory would not allow defendants to escape liability as defensive
use would. 71
The majority's concerns with respect to the complexity which
would be introduced, and the potentiality for multiple liability and
duplicative recoveries, were dismissed not because these concerns
were frivolous, but because the policies underlying private treble
damage actions outweighed these costs. Recognizing that complex
and difficult problems of economic theories and proof would have
to be heard, the dissenters simply noted that the same problem
72. 97 S.Ct. at 2070.
73. See note 47 supra. Economic factors also led the majority to reject a middle-ground
approach which, even in the case of no preexisting contract, would allow indirect purchasers
to sue where a middleman normally adds a percentage markup to the goods. According to
the majority, however, since this percentage may differ depending on factors such as the
strength of demand, proof of what portion was passed-on would still be difficult. If the Court
had wished to play Solomon, this would have been one place to do it; proof of changed
markups would not be difficult to obtain, and variation in other economic factors could be
dealt with to that degree of specificity required in antitrust cases.
74. The majority noted that it was unlikely that "all potential plaintiffs could or would be
joined." 97 S.Ct. at 2072.
75. Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ. Mr. Justice Blackmun, although joining the dis-
sent, filed a short separate opinion in which he noted that the majority decision would have
been different had Hanover Shoe not been decided.
76. 97 S.Ct. at 2078-79. The dissent also thought that the legislative history of section 4C
made clear the intent of Congress that indirect purchasers could recover under that section,
and that this should apply to section 4 as well. See note 71 supra.
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arose in almost all antitrust trials. More concern was expressed over
the majority's fear of duplicative recovery. In only two situations
is it possible for the defendant to pay treble damages more than
once: where suit is brought in different courts; and where money has
been recovered through settlement or judgment in an action and a
subsequent suit is filed. Concern over the first situation was negated
by procedural mechanisms which allow for inter-district consolida-
tion. In the second, because of the length of most antitrust proceed-
ings, the statute of limitations would probably run for a subsequent
suit before judgment was obtained in the first.77 In any event, how-
ever, the possibility of a few duplicative recoveries "does not...
justify erecting a bar against all recoveries by indirect purchasers
without regard to whether the particular case presents a significant
danger of double recovery."78
Both the majority and dissent asked whether allowing recovery by
indirect purchasers would best serve the purposes of private treble
damage actions; and after examining the same operative factors,
they reached diametrically opposite results. The majority, at least
in theory, was wrong. Common sense would dictate that one injured
by the anticompetitive results of a violation recover;7" especially
weak is the rationale that a party is denied his day in courtbecause
he brings a complex matter for determination. On the other hand,
no defendant, notwithstanding his transgressions, should be sub-
jected to paying six or nine times the actual damages caused in the
name of "strong antitrust enforcement" or "deterrence"; treble
damages are at least adequate.
Illinois Brick, however, was not decided on theoretical grounds.
The interpretation given section 4 turned on expediency and practi-
cality: if recovery is allowed, litigation will become more complex
or some parties may pay more than once; if not, some persons will
be denied their due. What choice do we make? The answer chosen
by the majority was the latter.
Perhaps the most cogent criticism of the majority position is that
it establishes too hard and fast a rule. A better result may have been
77. Settlement might present a different situation. This was not directly addressed.
78. 97 S.Ct. at 2083.
79. See Brunswick, Part II supra.
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to allow each case to be examined by the trial judge early in the pre-
trial period to see which, if any, of the factors militating against
indirect purchaser recovery were present. As the dissent noted, the
possibility of multiple recovery will not be a factor in most cases.
The same may be true of the other factors in other situations. Now,
however, where an indirect purchaser is a plaintiff, his claim is
negated immediately on a motion to dismiss before it is ascertained
whether the practicalities of his case demand such a result."0
The most interesting question raised by Illinois Brick is its effect
on the new parens patriae provisions. The question is whether
"injury" means the same thing in sections 4 and 4C. Supporters of
section 4C will argue correctly that Congress clearly intended that
indirect purchasers be within those "injured" under 4C. Opponents
will argue correctly that 4C was intended to do no more than give
state attorneys general standing and created no increased liability.
The majority recognized both arguments and weighted the latter
more heavily. Adoption of the former view in establishing the status
of indirect purchasers was not precluded, however. It may be that
Congress will solve the problem by accepting the majority's invita-
tion to reverse the result of the case legislatively."1
IV. "WE WERE RIGHT THE FIRST TIME"
In United States v. White Motor Co.,82 a district court, sustaining
the government's motion for summary judgment, held that vertical
customer and territorial restraints were per se violative of section 1
of the Sherman Act.83 The Supreme Court, holding that they did
"not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which
80. Cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 2549, 2558 n.16 (1977) infra,
at Part IV, where the Court sought to avoid "an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the
law." Has the majority breached this principle in disallowing recovery to all indirect
purchasers?
81. Senator Kennedy and Congressman Rodino have introduced a bill by which any person
"injured in fact," either directly or indirectly, may recover. Sections 4, 4A (conferring stand-
ing for damages on the United States), and 4C would be amended. See 823 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (July 21, 1977); Wall Street Journal, July 18, 1977, at 3, col. 1.
Opinions concerning whether Hanover Shoe should be overturned by legislation differ. See
830 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-6 (Sept. 15, 1977).
82. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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these arrangements emerge," reversed and remanded the case for
trial.84
Vertical territorial and customer restrictions, i.e., restraints im-
posed by a manufacturer on his customers, which in some way limit
where or to whom the latter can sell the manufacturer's goods, come
in a variety of forms. First, and most restrictive, are closed territory
distribution grants, which allow the customer to sell only to persons
or designated types of customers within his assigned territory. 5
Under this arrangement, there is no competition among distributors
of the manufacturer's product. Second are arrangements which
make it unpleasant for the distributor to sell outside his territory.
Among these are "areas of primary responsibility"8 and "profit
pass-over" provisions .8  Third are "location clauses" which allow
the distributor to sell to anyone but provide that he may do so from
only one or more designated locations.88 Finally, the manufacturer
may grant the distributor an "exclusive territory," with the caveat
that at the manufacturer's discretion, another distributor may be
put therein when demand necessitates.89
84. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
85. The restraints in White Motor were of this type. Many vertical agreements include
some combination of the restraints described herein.
86. The distributor is given a territory in which he is expected to make his primary promo-
tional and sales efforts; however, he may sell to customers without the area. This type of
arrangement has been tested under the rule of reason and generally upheld. See, e.g., Colo-
rado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987
(1973).
87. Under a profit pass-over arrangement, the distributor, although assigned a specific
territory, can sell to anyone. When, however, he sells to customers outside his assigned
territory, he must pay some amount to the distributor assigned to that area. These generally
have been upheld under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc.,
353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
8. These, also, are tested under the rule of reason and have been upheld. See, e.g., Salco
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975).
For a complete discussion of vertical restraints, see generally ABA ANTITRuST SECTION
MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL REsTRICTIONs LmIrrING INTRABRAND COMPETITION (1977).
89. The economic effects of vertical restraints are analyzed in conjunction with the discus-
sion of Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 2549 (1977), infra notes 115-
16.
For the present, suffice it to say that vertical restraints will normally lessen intrabrand
competition, i.e., competition between distributors selling the same brand. Other manufac-
turers, of course, may produce a product reasonably interchangeable therewith. The effect of
a vertical restraint on interbrand competition, i.e., competition between different brands,
may be neutral, favorable or unfavorable, depending on the circumstances of the particular
case.
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1
The Court's rationale in White Motor was simply that it did not
know, and could not ascertain from the record, the effect vertical
restraints have on competition." The decision was not that the rule
of reason was necessarily the proper standard of analysis, but only
that it was impossible from the record to ascertain whether the
restraints should be placed in the per se unreasonable category.
The same effective result was reached by the Court this term in
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,91 but not until the
Court unnecessarily overruled a 1967 decision 2 which held that cer-
tain vertical restraints are per se unreasonable. Prior to 1962, Syl-
vania marketed its televisions through distributors who sold them
to a large number of retailers. Because of a shrinking market share, 3
it ceased using distributors and commenced selling directly to a
select group of retailers, each of whom agreed to sell only from the
location franchised by Sylvania. An express purpose of this location
clause arrangement was to decrease the number of retailers selling
Sylvania products to lessen intrabrand competition. Continental
T.V., a Sylvania franchisee in San Francisco, determined to estab-
lish a store in Sacramento. When it did so, Sylvania terminated the
franchise, and Continental brought suit under section 1.1
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.," the Court had been
Possible rationales for a manufacturer or supplier instituting vertical restraints are dis-
cussed in WARREN, supra note 31, at 132-36.
90. The case represented the first time vertical restraints had come before the Court, 372
U.S. at 262, and since the question had been decided below on summary judgment, evidence
on competitive effect was lacking. The Court concluded that vertical restraints
• . . may be too dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable protections against
aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for breaking
into or staying in business (citations omitted) and within the "rule of reason." We need
to know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrangements on competi-
tion to decide whether they have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack
any redeeming virtue" (citation omitted) and therefore should be classified as per se
violations of the Sherman Act. ...
Id. at 263.
91. 97 S.Ct. 2549 (1977).
92. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
93. Its share of the national television market was between one and two percent. 97 S.Ct.
at 2551-52 n.4.
94. The policy, indeed, increased Sylvania's share of the television market. Id. at 2552.
95. The manner in which the case arose is somewhat more complicated than explained
here. Continental's action was actually a counterclaim. Because, however, this is immaterial
for purposes of analysis, the operative facts are simplified.
96. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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presented with vertical restraints at two levels in the chain of distri-
bution. Schwinn, a large and strong manufacturer of bicycles, dis-
tributed its products in three ways: sales to distributors who, in
turn, resold to retailers franchised by Schwinn; sales to franchised
retailers pursuant to consignment agreements with distributors;
and direct sales to retailers with a commission being paid the dis-
tributor taking the order. Distributors, who were assigned territo-
ries, could sell only to retailers in their territory and only to retailers
franchised by Schwinn. Each franchised retailer could sell only to
the public and not to unfranchised retailers. Moreover, each was
franchised to sell only from prescribed locations. 7
Noting that the government did not argue that the restrictions
were per se illegal, and taking heed of White Motor, a majority of
the Court held that it must examine "the specifics of the challenged
practices and their impact upon the marketplace""8 to determine
whether the methods of distribution were reasonable under section
1. Seeming to quickly discard this cautious approach, the majority,
finding that Schwinn was not a newcomer to the market or a failing
company, two factors held to be relevant in determining reason-
ableness in White Motor, held the vertical restraints per se illegal
where the manufacturer had parted with title, risk and, therefore,
dominion over the product. 9 Thus, under the plan where Schwinn
sold to distributors, it could not dictate where or to whom the dis-
tributor sold. Moreover, once the retailer took title, whether from
Schwinn or from a distributor, Schwinn could not restrict to whom
he sold.'9 "
In Sylvania, the district court instructed the jury in strict con-
formance with the Schwinn rule; if Sylvania parted with dominion
over the goods and thereafter attempted to restrict locations, the
97. Thus, the distributors were subjected to the most stringent form of vertical territorial
and customer restraints, but the retailers were subject to more relaxed prohibitions; the
retailer could sell to any consumer, notwithstanding the customer's place of residence.
98. 388 U.S. at 374.
99. Id. at 382.
100. Where title did not pass to the distributor, for example, under a consignment arrange-
ment, Schwinn retained its rights of control.
Surprisingly, when Schwinn was sent back to the trial court, it was settled by a consent
decree that specifically allowed both areas of primary responsibility and location clauses.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Il1. 1968).
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restraint was per se unreasonable. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en
banc, reversed by a divided vote. 01
Five factors led the Ninth Circuit to conclude that the Sylvania
location clauses should not be held per se unreasonable. First, al-
though the language of Schwinn was broad enough to invalidate the
clauses under the per se rule, the language should not be applied
literally; each different type of vertical restraint should be examined
on its own facts. And since there are significant differences in the
degrees of anticompetitive effects under location clauses and under
the totally closed Schwinn system, the court held that the per se
rule did not apply.102 Second, all precedent testing the validity of
location clauses had applied the rule of reason.1 3 Third, precedent
testing other types of vertical restraints which do not foreclose to-
tally intrabrand competition, including exclusive distributor-
ships,"4 also had applied the rule of reason. Fourth, application of
the per se rule would harm small business.0 5 Finally, since location
clauses may be procompetitive because of their effects on inter-
brand competition, application of the per se rule might foil the basic
policy of the Sherman Act, that of promoting economic competi-
tion.' The Ninth Circuit was able, thus, to uphold the location
clause without tackling the Schwinn rule head-on.
'101. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976). A panel
of the court had affirmed the district court decision, [1974-11 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
75,072 (9th Cir. 1974), but this decision was subsequently withdrawn in order that the case
could be reconsidered. [1974-21 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 75,435 (9th Cir. 1974).
102. 537 F.2d at 1000-01. The court saw two major distinctions: First, in Schwinn, distribu-
tors could not sell to any retailer who resided outside the distributor's territory. Each distribu-
tor was totally insulated from competition by other distributors, and therefore, "intrabrand
competition . . . was wholly destroyed." Id. at 990. Under the location clause, however, the
Sylvania retailer could, at least in theory, sell to anyone. Second, Schwinn was a tremendous
factor in the market for bicycles, whereas Sylvania was insignificant in the market for televi-
sions. Id. at 991.
103. See note 88 supra.
104. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d
71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). See notes 86 & 87 supra.
105. The effect would be particularly devastating on franchising. The small franchisee,
supposedly, would spread himself too thin in attempting to sell everywhere rather than
concentrating his efforts in one area. If the franchisee grew too large, other franchisees would
have trouble competing in their area with the giant. Qualified franchisees would be difficult
to obtain. Finally, if franchisees, for any reason, could not endure in the market, the franchi-
sor might be induced to vertically integrate forward to distribute his products.
106. The court notes, incorrectly, that before the per se approach is used, the practice must
be one that always involves an unreasonable restraint. Here, it had not been proved that the
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The Supreme Court, in an uncharacteristic move, examined not
only the question of location clauses, but the entire plethora of
vertical restraints, including those held per se unreasonable in
Schwinn.107 The Ninth Circuit was upheld, and moreover, Schwinn
was overruled.10 8
To reach its result, the Court used a two-step approach remark-
ably similar in some ways to that used in Illinois Brick. First, it
found that the restrictions held per se invalid in Schwinn were suffi-
ciently similar to the Sylvania location clauses that the same rules
of law should apply. Having done this, the Court left itself the
choice of either overruling Schwinn or holding, as no circuit court
had done, that location clauses were per se unreasonable. 19 Second,
after examining the proper role of the per se rule in antitrust en-
forcement; noting that there was no reason for distinguishing be-
decrease in intrabrand competition brought about by the Sylvania practice outweighed the
procompetitive effects on interbrand competition:
We recognize, of course, that in establishing a locations practice, Sylvania did check
intrabrand competition to some extent. This was an inevitable incident to Sylvania's
attempt to promote and maintain interbrand competition. However, to ignore Syl-
vania's ultimate purpose to remain in the market as a viable competitor, thereby
fostering interbrand competition, and to consider only the fact that its practice slightly
limited intrabrand competition, is to overlook the forest while watching the trees. The
free market policy of the antitrust laws would not be served by fashioning rules which
foster intrabrand competition to the point of extinguishing interbrand competition.
537 F.2d at 1000-01.
107. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 2549 (1977). The Court's
decision to reexamine the Schwinn rule, and thus broaden its analysis when it easily could
have distinguished the case is unusual because the present Court has seldom gone beyond
what was absolutely necessary to decide the particular case before it. In Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 603 (1976), discussed infra, at Part VII, this policy was stated
explicitly:
Although it is tempting to try to fashion a rule which would govern the decision of
the liability issue and the damage issue in all future cases presenting state action
issues, we believe the Court should adhere to its settled policy of giving concrete
meaning to the general language of the Sherman Act by a process of case-by-case
adjudication of specific controversies.
108. Mr. Justice Powell wrote the opinion for a six-man majority. Mr. Justice White con-
curred, see notes 119-21 infra, and accompanying text, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no
part in the decision. Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissented in a one paragraph opinion, simply
noting that the Schwinn rule should not be overruled, and that the Sylvania location clauses
should be held invalid.
109. In Illinois Brick, the Court framed the case such that it had the choice of overruling
Hanover Shoe or precluding the plaintiff from recovering. It chose the latter. In Sylvania, the
question seen by the Court was whether to overrule Schwinn or allow recovery. The Court
chose the former. It was a bad term for plaintiffs.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1
tween sale and nonsale transactions as had been done in Schwinn;
and finding that vertical restraints were often procompetitive, the
Court struck down the Schwinn rule of automatic per se invalidity.
The major departure of the Court from the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion concerned whether the restraints in Schwinn could be distin-
guished in a legally significant manner from those in Sylvania. Fo-
cusing only on restraints placed by the two manufacturers on their
retailers, Mr. Justice Powell, for the majority, found no differences,
because in each case the effect was to reduce, but not eliminate,
intrabrand competition.' The Court also rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit's distinction based on Schwinn's relatively large market share.
The question was then whether location clauses should be de-
clared per se unreasonable or whether Schwinn should be overruled.
Noting the almost unanimous disapproval of the Schwinn rule by
both courts"' and commentators,"' the Court held that the per se
rule should be examined to determine if its underlying policies justi-
fied its application to vertical restraints.
The per se rule is a judicial shortcut; it allows a court to dispense
with long and complicated proof of a violation's economic effect and
thus serves judicial economy." 3 But before the rule is invoked, the
110. This, of course, was true at the retail level. In Schwinn, the retailers were bound by
location clauses but could sell to anyone except unfranchised retailers. Thus, as in Sylvania,
intrabrand competition was not eliminated completely. The situation was different at the
distributor level in Schwinn; but because Sylvania did not use distributors, the restraints
placed thereon by Schwinn were not material in comparing the two cases.
Even, however, if it were relevant to compare the restraints on Schwinn distributors and
those on Sylvania retailers, the majority noted that its result would have been the same
because there was no indication in Schwinn that the Court there deemed the degree of
reduction in intrabrand competition to be pivotal. 97 S.Ct. at 2556 n.12.
111. See, e.g., Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974). But see Adolph
Coors Co. v. A&S Wholesalers, Inc., [1977-11 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,565 (10th Cir.
July 29, 1977), a post-GTE Sylvania case upholding vertical territorial and customer re-
straints.
112. See, e.g., Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U. L. REV.
595 (1968).
113. A cost-benefit analysis is necessary:
The probability that anitcompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the
severity of those consequences must be balanced against its pro-competitive conse-
quences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects
the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the
time and expense necessary to identify them.
97 S.Ct. at 2558 n.16.
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conduct questioned should be "manifestly anti-competitive. '""I The
question was whether vertical restraints exhibit the consistent anti-
competitive effects necessary for invocation of the per se rule. The
Court found that in the abstract, the competitive effect of a vertical
restraint was indeterminate. Although intrabrand competition
would be reduced, interbrand competition might be increased sig-
nificantly," 5 in which case the overall competitive effect might be
positive.' 6
Thus, the automatic application of the per se rule to vertical
restraints was unjustified. Although there may be certain situations
in which the per se rule should be applied, the Court held that
before the rule is invoked, the practice challenged should exhibit a
"demonstrable economic effect," which justifies its use.1 ' In all
other cases, the standard of reasonableness is proper."'
114. Id. at 2558.
115. Ceteris paribus, restraints on interbrand competition are more destructive of competi-
tion than those which lessen intrabrand competition. As the Court noted, Id. at 2559 n.19,
The extreme example of a deficiency of interbrand competition is monopoly, where
there is only one manufacturer.
Thus, there may be fierce intrabrand competition among the distributors of a prod-
uct produced by a monopolist and no intrabrand competition among the distributors
of a product produced by a firm in a highly competitive industry. But when interbrand
competition exists, as it does among television manufacturers, it provides a significant
check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consum-
ers to substitute a different brand of the same product.
116. The potential positive effects on interbrand competition seen by the majority were
efficiencies which the manufacturer might realize in the distribution of his goods; the incen-
tive to promote the product induced in the distributor by his grant of an exclusive right to
sell the product in a certain territory or to certain customers; the disincentive toward forward
vertical integration that arises from allowing vertical restraints; the reduction of barriers of
entry to new manufacturers by their ability to recruit retailers who, if given exclusive territo-
ries, will make the necessary investment to establish outlets; and the offering by retailers of
additional services if given some type of exclusivity. Id. at 2560.
The last argument is especially interesting in light of the fact that advocates of fair trade
laws argued that the high prices often charged for fair traded merchandise were justified to
give the retailer a profit cushion which could be used to provide additional services. See LEWIS
SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 959 (4th ed. 1972). Congress, evi-
dently, rejected this rationale. See note 2 supra.
117. 97 S.Ct. at 2562. Of course, if an overriding anticompetitive effect must be proved, it
seems senseless to denominate the rule as per se.
118. The Court also analyzed the Schwinn reliance on the distinction between passage of
title and agency or consignment arrangements, and properly concluded that "the competitive
impact of vertical restrictions is [not] significantly affected by the form of the transaction."
Id. at 2560. The Court felt it necessary to inject this analysis into the decision because the
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In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice White followed the ration-
ale of the Ninth Circuit and distinguished Sylvania from Schwinn
on the bases of differences in competitive effects and market power.
He, moreover, argued that differences of treatment were justified
where an agency or consignment distributional method was used as
compared to an outright sale. In the former situation, the goods
continue to belong to the manufacturer, and "businessmen should
have the freedom to dispose of the goods they own as they see fit.""'
Finally, he saw little economic distinction between many types of
vertical customer and territorial restraints, and vertical price fixing
which long has been condemned under the per se rule,' 2 noting that
the distinction "may be as difficult to justify as that of Schwinn
under the terms of the majority's analysis. 1 2'
Thus, the Court has retreated to its position in White Motor, and
one must wonder with Mr. Justice White whether other practices
traditionally classified as unreasonable per se will be reexamined.1 22
form of the transaction, rather than the restraint's effect on competition, was the "pivotal
factor" in the Schwinn decision. Id. at 2559.
119. Id. at 2567 (White, J., concurring).
120. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Inc., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
The majority justified the different treatment given to non-price vertical restraints on three
questionable grounds. First, vertical price fixing almost always reduces interbrand competi-
tion; second, if all manufacturers engage in fair trading, horizontal price fixing is induced;
finally, Congress, by repeal of the fair trade exemption, had expressed its approval of per se
rule application to vertical price fixing.
Because these arguments, taken either singularly or together, seem weak, perhaps the
majority should have relied on the overriding importance of price as a competitive variable
and simply noted that where a price is fixed, the anticompetitive effect is much more immedi-
ate and direct than where customers or territories are allocated and any effect on price is
indirect. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940)
(price is the "central nervous system of the economy"). Cf. United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc.,
820 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 1977) (practices tradition-
ally classified as indirect price fixing must be shown to be price fixing before per se rule
applies).
121. 97 S.Ct. at 2568.
122. The court's decision this term in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises,
Inc., Part V infra, although not destroying the per se rule in tie-in analyses, certainly makes
the per se test more difficult to meet. Moreover, for a number of years, courts have been
retreating from the hard and fast rule of Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S.
207 (1959), that group refusals to deal are per se illegal. See, e.g., Hatley v. American Quarter
Horse Ass'n., [1977-11 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 61,441 (5th Cir. May 19, 1977).
Perhaps the most interesting question is whether the Court will reconsider its decision in
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), and United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S.
596 (1972). Both of these cases involved horizontal market allocations, which have tradition-
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Moreover, in the situation where intrabrand competition is com-
pletely foreclosed, it is difficult to understand why the per se rule
should not apply. In other contexts where some restraint is found
necessary or justified, the Court has held that the restraint must not
only be justified but "even then [restrain] only to the minimum
extent necessary."'13 Types of vertical restraints less restrictive than
those found in Schwinn certainly would result in the benefits to
interbrand competition envisioned by the majority.
It would seem that franchisors will be the primary beneficiaries
of the Sylvania ruling. It can only be hoped that they do not use the
decision to increase unreasonably the vertical control exerted over
the independent businessmen - the franchisees - who are the
backbone of a successful franchising operation.'"2 Even if they do,
however, a violation of section 1 is going to be difficult to prove.
V. NINE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT
Perhaps no individual in the history of antitrust litigation has
tried so hard and come away with so little as A. B. Fortner, Jr., of
Louisville, Kentucky. His case, involving Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
("Fortner"), his corporation, visited the district court three times,
a circuit court of appeals three times, and if grants of certiorari are
ally been classified as per se unreasonable. Because, however, the parties to the market
allocation scheme were distributors for the same company, the effect of the conspiracy was
to reduce intrabrand competition. In fact, Topco argued that the agreement was necessary
to allow it to compete with its larger competitors, and the district court upheld the allocation
under the rule of reason. United States v. Topco Assoc., 319 F.Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
The Court, however, automatically applied the per se rule with no analysis. Because the
effects on competition of vertical restraints and the Topco agreements are almost identical,
it is hard to see how Topco can stand in light of the analysis used in Sylvania, notwithstand-
ing that Topco was cited with seeming approval. 97 S.Ct. at 2562 n.28. If the two cases are
considered together, their similarities are striking; arguments and logic rejected in Topco
were accepted in Sylvania.
123. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 389 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (whether or not conduct arguably allowed under federal regulatory statute was exempt
from antitrust challenge).
124. Some franchisees will welcome the decision because tight vertical control, which leads
to fewer competitors, gives them a comfortable feeling. Others, however, who desire that their
businesses grow to the fullest extent may be in for a rude awakening when their present
franchise agreements expire. Many exclusive territory provisions which completely foreclose
intrabrand competition are going to be used.
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excluded, the Supreme Court three times; and in the end, fifteen
years after suit was filed, it came away with nothing.' 5
Fortner, a real estate development firm, entered into two con-
tracts with United States Steel Homes Credit Corp. ("Credit
Corp."), a subsidiary of United States Steel Corp., by which the
Credit Corp. agreed to finance land acquisitions and the purchase
of prefabricated houses by Fortner, if Fortner agreed to purchase the
houses from the Homes Division of U. S. Steel. Fortner was able to
borrow substantially more than the purchase price of the houses
sold it, on particularly attractive terms.
Subsequent to entering the contracts, Fortner discovered that the
houses were defective and priced at a noncompetitive high level. It
filed suit against U. S. Steel and the Credit Corp. in 1962, charging
violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The crux of
Fortner's complaint was that the contracts were illegal tying agree-
ments,' 26 i.e., that the purchase of homes was tied to the granting
of favorable credit terms by the Credit Corp.'12
125. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 861 (1977).
126. The basic definition of a tie-in is the following:
A "tie-in" generally may be defined as an arrangement whereby a seller conditions
his sale of a product or service (the "tying product") upon a buyer's purchase of a
separate product or service (the "tied product") from the seller or from a designated
third party.
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUsT LAW DEVELOPMENTS 38 (1975).
127. A complete analysis of the economic effects of tie-ins is beyond the scope of this
article. To properly analyze, however, the opinions subsequently discussed, some understand-
ing of both the favorable and unfavorable aspects of tie-ins is helpful.
Tie-ins may lead to three general types of adverse economic consequences. First, they may
allow a seller to create monopoly power in the market for the tied product. This is accom-
plished by "leverage," i.e., "the use of monopoly power in one market (the market for the
tying good) to create monopoly power in a second market (the market for the tied good)."
WARREN, supra note 25, at 193. It may be accomplished by "foreclosure," where because of
the tie, competitors in the tied product are unable to sell to the victim of the tie-in. Foreclo-
sure results not because competitors have an inferior product, but because of some monopoly
power in the market for the tying good. Id. at 197. Competition in the market for the tied
product also may be affected adversely because the tie-in creates barriers to entry, especially
when the tying and tied products are complementary, i.e., used together. See PETER AsCH,
ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 348 (1970) [hereinafter cited as AscH].
Secondly, tie-ins may allow the seller to exercise monopoly power in the market for the
tying product. The arrangement allows the seller to engage in price discrimination. Where
different customers have different elasticities of demand for the tying product and if the tied
product is complementary, it allows the seller to "meter" use of the tying product, thus giving
a rough estimate of elasticity. WARREN, supra note 25, at 198-99. The tie-in also may allow
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A review of the evolution of standards used to test the legality of
tie-ins is helpful in analyzing the questions placed before the courts
by Fortner. In International Business Machines Corp. v. United
States,121 the Court struck down an IBM practice of leasing its pat-
ented tabulating machines only on the condition that the lessee also
purchase tabulating cards from IBM. Because its machine was pat-
ented and because its only competitor at that time was Remington
Rand, IBM had significant power in the market for the tying pro-
duct, although there was no finding to this effect by the Court. It
held simply that the practice was illegal under section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act,129 because the tie-in "precludes the use of the cards of any
the seller to "share the risk" of the tying product with the purchaser, thus inducing more
demand. Professor Warren, relying on the analysis in Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing,
55 Nw. U. L. Rv. 62 (1960), explains this in the franchising context as follows:
The firm selling franchises could offer them at a relatively low price to reduce the
risk of the prospective franchisee. In return, the franchisor could require that the
franchisee purchase all of the product sold in the franchised outlet from him. By
offering the franchise at a relatively low price, the franchisor shares the risk with the
franchisee, but to compensate the franchisor, he is allowed to share the rewards.
WARREN, supra note 25, at 201.
Third, tie-ins have a seemingly coercive effect on purchasers. To get one product he wants,
the buyer must purchase another which he may not desire. This argument, however, is
somewhat fallacious because a purchaser cannot be forced to pay more for the combination
than the tying good alone is worth to him. The argument is especially weak when there are
plenty of alternatives to the tying good on the market.
All these criticisms are based on the seller having some degree of monopoly power in the
market for the tying product. If there is little or no monopoly power, the purchaser, if he does
not want the tied product, simply purchases the tying product elsewhere.
There are several arguably favorable consequences of tie-ins which should be mentioned.
First, a competitor under some legal or illegal constraint not to lower his price may do so, in
effect, by offering a "free" tied good. See AscH at 348. Second, the tie-in "may facilitate new
entry into fields where established sellers have wedded their customers to them by ties of
habit and custom." Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 514 n.9 (1969)
(Fortner I) (White & Harlan, JJ., dissenting); see also United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Third, a tie-
in may protect good will or quality control; for example, a franchisor may attempt to require
his franchisees to purchase the product sold to the public through him to assure high and
uniform quality. Often, however, there are less restrictive ways to accomplish the same
objective. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972). Finally, if the tying and tied products are functionally related, a tie-in
may reduce the combined costs of placing the product on the market because of economic
efficiencies of joint production and distribution. See Fortner i supra, at 514 n.9.
128. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). Where both the tying and tied products are goods as opposed
to services, section 3 may be used to challenge the arrangement. Where, however, one of the
products is a service, section 3 is inapplicable and section 1 of the Sherman Act is used.
Section 3 is an "incipiency" statute similar to section 7. See note 17 supra.
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competitor. . ... "I" Thus, the Court was concerned with foreclosure
in the market for the tied good, but the degree of foreclosure neces-
sary for a violation was not made clear. 3'
The focus in International Salt Co. v. United States' 2 was also on
foreclosure; a per se rule was introduced. International conditioned
its lease of machinery using salt on the purchase of salt by custom-
ers from it. Again, the tying products were patented and thus, al-
though it was not discussed in the opinion, International clearly had
some degree of monopoly power in the market for the tying good.'
33
The decision, however, was based on the effect of the tie-in on the
market for the tied product. The Court held that "it is unreason-
able, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial mar-
ket.', 3
4
Rules for per se illegality under both section 3 and section 1 were
espoused by the Court in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States.'35 It held that a tie-in is per se unreasonable under section 3
where the seller has a monopolistic position in the tying product
market or, drawing from International Salt, a substantial volume of
130. 298 U.S. at 135.
131. See also United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922). The Court,
there held that United's 95% share of the market for shoe machinery indicated sufficient
power in the market for a tying product to declare the tie-in presented illegal under section
3.
132. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
133. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949), the Court, in analyzing
International Salt, noted that it was not established that equivalent machines could not be
obtained.
134. 332 U.S. at 396. The $500,000 of salt sold for use in the machines in 1944 was held to
be "substantial."
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), which examined the legality of
requirements contracts under sections 1 and 3, the Court explained the necessity for power
in the market for the tying product:
In the usual case only the prospect of reducing competition would persuade a seller
to adopt such a contract and only his control of the supply of the tying device, whether
conferred by patent monopoly or otherwise obtained, could induce a buyer to enter one.
(Citation omitted). The existence of market control of the tying device, therefore,
affords a strong foundation for the presumption that it has been or probably will be
used to limit competition in the tied product also.
337 U.S. at 306.
See also the "block booking" cases, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131 (1948), where it was recognized that copyrights on the tying products produce
market power.
135. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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commerce in the market for the tied good is restrained. If both tests
were met, then section 1 was violated.
Although Times-Picayune spoke of the necessity for a
"monopolistic position" in the market for the tying product, the
Court retreated somewhat from this seemingly stringent position in
Northern Pacific Railway v. United States.'3' The Court held tie-ins
per se illegal "whenever a party has sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition
in the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantial' amount
of interstate commerce is affected." '37 Thus, the "monopolistic posi-
tion" standard in Times-Picayune was interpreted to mean no more
than a seller's ability to impose an "appreciable restraint" in the
tied product market. In the absence of some other explanation, the
fact that a number of tie-ins existed was "compelling evidence" of
power in the market for the tying product."'
Thus, the degree of market power in the tying product necessary
to sustain the per se rule was unclear when Fortner filed suit. Early
cases appeared either to involve situations where strong market
dominance could be inferred because of a grant of patent or copy-
right, or to state simply that a "monopolistic position" was neces-
sary. Northern Pacific, however, could be read to mean that little
evidence was necessary to prove the requisite power."'
The first time Fortner was before the district court, summary
judgment was entered against it; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.' Find-
ing that the Credit Corp. had no patent or monopoly on money, that
other lenders could meet its attractive credit terms if they so de-
sired, and that, therefore, generous credit terms were not equivalent
to market power, the court held that the necessary power in the
136. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
137. Id. at 6.
138. Id. at 7-8.
139. Even Mr. Justice Black's example in Northern Pacific of what would not constitute
sufficient power was comforting to antitrust plaintiffs:
As a simple example, if one of a dozen food stores in a community were to refuse to
sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar it would hardly tend to restrain competition
in sugar if its competitors were ready and able to sell flour by itself.
356 U.S. at 6-7.
140. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 293 F. Supp. 762 (W.D. Ky.
1966), aff'd per curiam, [1968] TRasn REG. REp. 72,577 (6th Cir. 1968).
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market for the tying product, money, could not be shown. Moreover,
since only .00032% of the land in the county was affected by the
Fortner contracts, commerce in the tied product was not substan-
tially restrained.' 4 '
The Supreme Court reversed in 1969,142 holding that facts had
been raised which, if proved, would justify use of the per se rule.
With respect to the necessary restraint on the tied product, the
majority held that the proper measure was the "total volume of
sales tied by the sales policy under challenge," which would include
not only sales of houses to Fortner, but to all customers pursuant
to a tie-in arrangement.'4 3 Then, in a seeming further liberalization
of the lenient standard in Northern Pacific, the majority explained
that dominance in the market for the tying product was not neces-
sary. The test is "whether the seller has the power to raise prices,
or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with respect to
any appreciable number of buyers within the market." '
Fortner desired to offer several types of evidence to prove the
requisite market power in credit, and the majority felt the issue
should be determined at trial. First, Fortner offered to show that
competitors of U.S. Steel charged less for comparable houses. This
"may suggest," the majority said, power in the market for credit.'
Second, Fortner argued that the financing was uniquely advanta-
geous. The majority held that such advantageous terms "can re-
flect" the lender's economic advantage over its competitors.'46 One
141. 293 F. Supp. at 768-69. It is difficult to understand why the court used this as a test.
142. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). The
decision was five to four.
143. Id. at 502. Fortner alleged that its own purchases were approximately $190,000, which
the majority concluded was "not insubstantial."
144. Id. at 504.
145. Id. The majority said that
[slince in a freely competitive situation buyers would not accept a tying arrange-
ment obligating them to buy a tied product at a price higher than the going market
rate, this substantial price differential with respect to the tied product (prefabricated
houses) in itself may suggest that [U.S. Steel] had some special economic power in
the credit market.
Id.
146. Id. at 505. Affidavits showed that no other financial institution in the area would
match the Credit Corp. terms. The majority was careful to note, however, that economic
power can be inferred from uniqueness only where other creditors could not offer the advanta-
geous terms. Barriers may be legal, physical or economic. Where economic barriers prevent
[Vol. 12:1
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competitive advantage that U.S. Steel "may well have had" was the
nationwide scope of its operations. The majority suggested that if
these allegations were proved, the requisite economic power could
be inferred.
At this point, Fortner must have been extremely optimistic. The
case was remanded for trial, and even the most skeptical person
must have thought that proving power in the market for the tying
product would not be difficult, especially in light of the majority's
comments concerning what types of factors were relevant. On re-
mand, the trial judge directed a verdict for Fortner on liability, and
a jury found single damages of $93,200. This was reversed by the
Sixth Circuit,"7 which held that the question of power in the market
for the tying product should have been sent to the jury."' The mat-
ter was sent back for trial again.
On remand, jury was waived and the matter was determined by
the judge on the previous evidence with supplementation. He found
for Fortner again, and this time the Sixth Circuit affirmed.149 The
circuit court held that although an expert had testified that the loan
granted Fortner was unique in the area at that time, Fortner had
failed to show that either legal barriers or cost advantages had pre-
cluded other lenders from offering the same terms. Uniqueness,
then, was not proved to the extent necessary to show market power.
But Fortner had shown that (1) a substantial amount of business
in the tied product was involved; (2) a significant number of buyers
had accepted the tie-in; and (3) the houses were sold by U. S. Steel
at a price higher than that charged by competitors. Proof of these
factors was sufficient to show the requisite power notwithstanding
lack of proof on the question of uniqueness.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed;15 it analyzed whether
the factors discussed by the Sixth Circuit, and the proof on each,
competitors from offering the product, "the uniqueness test. . . is somewhat confusing since
the real source of economic power is not the product itself but rather the seller's cost advan-
tage in producing it." Id. at 505 n.2.
147. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., v. United States Steel Corp., 452 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
148. The Supreme Court had determined that the restraint on the tied product was suffi-
cient to meet that part of the per se test.
149. 523 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975).
150. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 861 (1977).
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
were sufficient to prove the necessary power in the market for the
tying product.'5 '
First, the corporate connection between the credit subsidiary and
U. S. Steel Corp. did not appear to provide the former with any
competitive advantage over other lenders. Thus, the affiliation was
not probative of economic power. Second, although many customers
had been subject to the tie-in, there was no evidence of either lever-
age or price discrimination. Third, the Court noted that even though
U. S. Steel houses were more expensive than those sold by others,
the financing was less expensive; therefore, the combined price for
the package may have been equal to or lower than a competitive
price.'5 2 Finally, it held that the only "uniqueness" about the tying
product was that the credit company was willing to accept a greater
risk - or a smaller profit - than its competitors, and this led to
no inference of economic power. The Court concluded that the evi-
dence "proves nothing more than a willingness to provide cheap
financing in order to sell expensive homes."' 53 Fortner, therefore,
was back where it started in 1962.
Without doubt, the seller must have some degree of monopoly
power in the market for the tying product before a violation should
be found; for otherwise it is impossible to coerce the buyer into the
tie-in. But the degree of power necessary remains a mystery.
Moreover, what must be proved? And how is it proved? The pat-
ent and copyright cases seem relatively simple, although it should
be expected that even in those, defendants will argue that there are
an abundance of reasonably interchangeable substitutes. What
151. Fortner's evidence, as explained the Court, showed the following:
(1) petitioners [the Credit Corp. and U.S. Steel's Home Division] were owned by
one of the Nation's largest corporations; (2) petitioners entered into tying agreements
with a significant number of customers in addition to Fortner; (3) the Home Division
charged respondent a noncompetitive price for its prefabricated homes; and (4) the
financing provided to Fortner was "unique," primarily because it covered 100% of
Fortner's acquisition and development costs.
Id. at 865.
152. Id. at 866-67. But see WARREN, supra note 25, at 194 (this does not negate possibility
of leverage). Professor Areeda suggests that at least in computing damages, the fact that the
tying product was sold at an unusually low price should be taken into consideration. Areeda,
Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HAv. L. REv. 1127, 1138 (1976).
153. 97 S.Ct. at 868. Clearly, this was the most important of the four factors. The Court
specifically stated that uniqueness had to be proved before market power was shown.
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about trademarks, especially in the franchising context? Can eco-
nomic power be inferred from the trademark itself when there are
150 other hamburger franchises which can be obtained?
Will it now be necessary to prove the defendant's market share
of the tying product? If so, all the problems of relevant market
definition arise. And even then, what size market share exhibits the
necessary power? Do concentration ratios become a relevant factor?
And if so, in the market for the tying or tied product? Would this
depend upon whether the defendant were attempting to create mo-
nopoly power in the tied product or exercise power in the market for
the tying product?
It may be that all defendants will attempt to prove that the price
of their tying products was below the competitive norm. 5 ' This, of
course, will introduce additional problems of proof, and even then,
it is not clear that such should be allowed as a defense to liability.
It seems time to stop using the phrase "per se" when testing tie-
ins. Tie-ins have never been per se illegal; their illegality has hinged
on economic questions concerning the markets for the tying and tied
products. Per se means nothing and adds nothing to the analysis.
And is the per se rule proper in any event? As the Court held in
Sylvania, a per se rule should not be used where the practice may
present benefits,'55 and we may well see the per se rule reexamined
in tie-in cases.
If, however, Fortner II makes anything clear, it is that many tie-
ins which do adversely affect competition will now pass muster
because of the seemingly increased proof necessary to show eco-
nomic power in the market for the tying product. It will be interest-
ing to see how plaintiffs attempt to prove this economic power after
Fortner II.
VI. FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT I - ENJOINING STATE PROCEEDINGS
There are several routes by which anticompetitive state action, or
anticompetitive activity by private parties in conjunction with the
154. Franchisors may argue, for example, that their tie-ins simply indicate "a willingness
to sell a cheap franchise in order to sell expensive supplies." Franchising World, May 1977,
p. 7, col. 4.
155. See note 113 supra, and accompanying text.
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state, can come into conflict with the federal antitrust laws. Perhaps
the most common situation is that where the defendant claims that
he has been commanded by the state to engage in anticompetitive
action.5 ' In addition, the so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine holds
that inducement of government action, even if prompted by anti-
competitive motives and otherwise violative of the antitrust laws,
is exempt from challenge. 157
The conflict was presented to the Court this term in a somewhat
different context in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.'58 There the
question was whether a state court proceeding which allegedly was
used to violate federal antitrust law could be enjoined by a federal
court under section 16 of the Clayton Act 159 notwithstanding the
Anti-Injunction Act."16 The case is interesting not only for its discus-
sion of federal procedure, but also for the light it sheds on when the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine is applicable to shield from challenge
state court litigation otherwise violative of the antitrust laws."
156. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The so-called "state action exemp-
tion" is the subject of Part VII infra.
157. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
158. 97 S.Ct. 2881 (1977).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). Section 16 confers standing upon private plaintiffs to seek
equitable redress and is analogous to section 4 which confers standing for damages.
160. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
161. Because much of the Vendo decision involves application of this doctrine, a brief
discussion of its background and substance may be helpful. In Noerr, the Court held that a
publicity campaign by railroads intended to influence a legislature to enact laws unfavorable
to truckers was exempt from challenge under the antitrust laws. The decision had two bases:
First, a democracy "depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to
their representatives." 365 U.S. at 137. Second, the right to petition the government is
protected by the first amendment. The Court, however, recognized an exception to this rule
where the conspiracy "is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt
to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the
Sherman Act would be justified." Id. at 144. The sham exception was presented to the Court
in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Trucking Unlimited], where it was alleged that one group of truckers persistently
instituted federal and state legal actions to defeat applications for operating rights filed by
another group. The Court held that the principles of Noerr applied to solicitation of help from
a court. But the judicial process cannot be abused: "[A] pattern of baseless, repetitive
claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judi-
cial processes have been abused." 404 U.S. at 513.
See also Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board
of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 1571 (1977).
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The Anti-Injunction Act attempts to prevent "needless friction
between state and federal courts."'u 2 It serves as an absolute prohibi-
tion against federal court injunctions of state court proceedings ex-
cept where the proceeding falls within one of the statute's express
exceptions:' 3 where such an injunction is expressly authorized by
Congress; where the injunction is necessary to aid a court in its
jurisdiction; and where the injunction is necessary to protect or
effectuate the court's judgment."4
With respect to the first exception, however, the Court has held
several times that "expressly authorized" does not mean that the
federal statute must literally state that it authorizes enjoining state
proceedings. Such an interpretation would mean that the policies
of many federal statutes could be frustrated by state court proceed-
ings.
In Mitchum v. Foster,1 5 where the question was whether a state
civil proceeding could be enjoined in a federal action which charged
that the state court action was violating the plaintiff's civil rights,'66
the Court held that the expressly authorized exception was met if
"an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy en-
forceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended
scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding."' 67 The legislative
history of the predecessor of section 1983 showed that its purpose
was to enforce the fourteenth amendment against state action, espe-
cially state judicial action. Since Congress, by enactment of section
1983, had made federal courts into watchdogs over their state coun-
terparts, the Court held that Congress had "expressly authorized"
federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings which violate section
1983. The question in Vendo was whether Congress had done the
same thing under section 16 of the Clayton Act.
Vendo's problems began in 1959, when it purchased a competitor
162. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940).
163. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
164. Even, however, if the state proceeding meets one of the exceptions, the federal court
might still refuse to hear the case on grounds of comity or abstention.
165. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
166. Suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
167. 407 U.S. at 238. In reviewing its decisions concerning the Act, the Court noted that
the federal statute need not expressly mention enjoining state court proceedings but only that
the policy of the federal statute could be frustrated if the federal court had no power to enjoin.
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and extracted from its former owner, Mr. Stoner, an employment
contract and a ten year covenant not to compete in any country
where Vendo did business. One specific purpose for the acquisition,
and the sole purpose of the covenant not to compete, was to elimi-
nate Stoner as a competitor.
Stoner, however, became involved with a Vendo competitor,
Lektro-Vend. Vendo brought suit in state court for breach of the
noncompetition agreement; the complaint was amended to include
a claim for theft of trade secrets; and subsequently, Vendo increased
its damage request. Judgment for over $7,000,000 was entered for
Vendo, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. 6' Stoner immedi-
ately brought suit in federal court to preliminarily enjoin collection
of the judgment under section 16, charging that Vendo had violated
both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The district court held that Stoner was likely to prevail on both
his claims.8 ' Section 1 was violated because the noncompetition
covenants were overly broad and the intent of Vendo was the elimi-
nation of competition. Section 2 was violated because Vendo exhib-
ited a "dangerous propensity for creation of an actual monopoly,"
and there was a specific intent to monopolize, one part of which was
the litigation commenced against Stoner. 70
The court realized that commercial litigation usually is protected
from antitrust challenge under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine but
held that the exemption is lost where litigation is "used as an inte-
gral part of a scheme attempting to monopolize and exclude compe-
tition."' 7 ' Finding that there was substantial evidence that Vendo's
168. Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 I1l.2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
169. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. III. 1975). Interestingly, the
judge was Richard W. McLaren, former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division.
170. 403 F. Supp. at 534.
171. Id. The Court held:
[I]f plaintiffs can prove that Vendo's state court litigation against the Stoner interests
was not a genuine attempt to use the adjudicative process legitimately, antitrust
liability in the instant case under section 2 of the Sherman Act would follow.
Id.
It is important to note that the court did not hold that baseless litigation itself would be a
violation. The litigation would be only one factor probative of an attempt to monopolize.
Baseless litigation brought by one entity without more does not seem to meet the substantive
standards for violation of any antitrust law.
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suit was an attempt to use the adjudicative process illegitimately,
the court held that this was an element of the section 2 offense.
Vendo's claim that the Anti-Injunction Act precluded the federal
court from enjoining collection of the state court judgment was re-
jected. The Court held that section 16 was an exception to the Act
because the "expressly authorized" standards of Mitchum were
met. The antitrust laws could be given their "intended scope" only
by staying the state court proceedings. 72 The Seventh Circuit af-
firmed, noting that Vendo was seeking "to thwart a federal antitrust
suit by the enforcement of state court judgments which are alleged
to be the very object of antitrust violations."'' 3
The Supreme Court reversed in an interesting decision.' Three
members of the Court held that section 16 is not an exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act; 175 two held that in some circumstances, it is an
exception; 76 and four said that section 16 was an exception on the
facts presented.' 7
A plurality, finding that section 16 is not an exception, relied
almost exclusively on Mitchum. Although they recognized that the
first test for the "expressly authorized" exception was met, i.e.,
"[t]he private action for damages conferred by the Clayton Act is
a 'uniquely federal right or remedy,'"" the second test was not.
Section 16 is not a federal statute which can be given its intended
scope only by enjoining state court actions. In Mitchum, although
the statute involved did not expressly authorize enjoining state ac-
tions, the legislative history made manifestly clear that such was
necessary for the statute to work. The legislative history of section
16 showed simply that Congress intended to give a private right for
equitable relief; not that it thought state court litigation would be
used to violate the antitrust laws.
172. No explanation was given for this conclusion.
173. 545 F.2d 1050, 1057 (7th Cir. 1976). The case, however, shows no affirmative effort by
Vendo to use its state court proceeding specifically to affect the antitrust suit. While Vendo's
suit may have been brought for an anticompetitive purpose, it was filed before the federal
action.
174. 97 S.Ct. 2881 (1977).
175. Rehnquist, Stewart & Powell, JJ.
176. Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J.
177. Stevens, Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.
178. 97 S.Ct. at 2887. The Court seemed to confuse sections 4 and 16. This suit involved
equitable relief, not damages.
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The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred, but their
decision was based on much narrower grounds. They argued that
whether section 16 could be given its intended scope without staying
state court proceedings would depend on the use which had been
made of the state court. An injunction could issue against a state
court proceeding if the proceedings were part of a pattern of baseless
and repetitive claims under. the Trucking Unlimited standard or
there was "some equivalent showing of grave abuse of the state
courts."'' 9 In Vendo, however, there was a single state court proceed-
ing; and moreover, Vendo was found to have a good cause of action.
Thus, it was not shown that Vendo had used litigation in state court
as an anticompetitive mechanism in and of itself. '°
The dissent held that Vendo's state court litigation violated the
Sherman Act and should, therefore, be enjoined. Noting that litiga-
tion in state courts can violate the antitrust laws' 8' and that section
16 is used to enjoin afititrust violations, the dissent found that the
injunction was expressly authorized.' 2 Rejected was the plurality's
stand that if the state court proceeding was illegal under the
Trucking Unlimited standard, future state court proceedings could
be enjoined. This rule, the dissent argued, would mean that the
victim would be driven out of business before any remedy would be
available, a result Congress could not have intended.'1
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun were chastized by
the dissenters for their belief that a multiplicity of lawsuits could
be enjoined but that one proceeding could not. After citing several
179. Id. at 2893 n.1.
180. The opinion seems to hold that if the state court proceedings, in and of themselves,
violate the antitrust laws, they can be enjoined.
181. 97 S.Ct. at 2897-98. The plurality read Noerr and Trucking Unlimited to mean that
if a pattern of sham litigation itself constituted a violation, future state proceedings could be
enjoined. Id. at 2889 n.6.
182. Id. at 2898-900. The plurality felt that this argument confused jurisdiction over the
subject matter in antitrust cases, which section 16 gives to federal courts, with whether a
court with jurisdiction has been expressly authorized under section 2283 to issue the injunc-
tion. Id. at 2890 n.8.
183. The dissent noted:
It would demean the legislative process to construe the eloquent rhetoric which accom-
panied the enactment of the antitrust laws as implicitly denying federal courts the
power to restrain illegal state court litigation simply because it was filed before the
federal case was concluded.
Id. at 2900.
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examples given in Trucking Unlimited where single abuses of gov-
ernment agencies had been held violative of the antitrust laws,"4
they noted that the "baseless and repetitive claims" mentioned in
the decision was not meant to be exclusive. Finally, the dissent held
that although the Illinois court found Vendo's claim meritorious,
this did not mean that there was no violation of federal antitrust
laws. The Illinois decision on the merits merely highlighted the fact
that "state and federal courts apply significantly different stan-
dards in evaluating contracts in restraint of trade."1 5
What is the rule of the case? A majority of the Court felt that
section 16 is an "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act in certain circumstances. Thus, the concurring and
dissenting members of the Court would hold that where the state
court proceeding was itself violative of the antitrust laws, it could
be enjoined. Their differences centered on what frequency of state
court litigation was necessary to violate the Sherman Act. A number
of baseless and repetitive claims would be required by the concur-
rence under the Trucking Unlimited rule. The dissent interpreted
the same case as holding that a single action could be sufficient.
Some persons, no doubt, will interpret the dissent to mean that
any sort of state court litigation which has an anticompetitive mo-
tive or effect can be enjoined. This interpretation plays havoc with
principles of federalism. Many perfectly legitimate state court ac-
tions, whether prosecuted successfully or not, have anticompetitive
effects, and one must hope that the dissent is not used to increase
litigation time by the filing of federal injunction suits under section
16.
Perhaps the importance of Vendo is not the effect it may have on
pending state litigation, but the effect it may have on the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine in general. 8 The doctrine grew in response to
184. Id. at 2902. The examples included perjury, commercial bribery of a government
purchasing agent, fraud on the patent office, and conspiracy with a licensing authority to
eliminate a competitor; in short, no situation analogous to that presented in the instant case.
185. Id. at 2903.
186. Suits in a state court by which a defendant seeks to enjoin that action on federal
antitrust grounds are infrequent. If that were the Court's sole concern, it is difficult to
understand why certiorari was even granted. More prevalent are cases where there is no state
court action which is sought to be enjoined, but a federal antitrust suit is simply defended
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groups attempting to solicit certain action by government agencies.
Its rationale, the first amendment, is the basic right of persons to
petition their government. Of course, "[i]t is well settled that First
Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they
are used as an integral part of conduct which violates a valid stat-
ute."'18 7 Certainly no policy of the first amendment protects at-
tempts to abuse government agencies through such practices as
commercial bribery or fraud on the patent office. Use of the state
courts, however, even in an anticompetitive manner, to present an
arguably meritorious claim presents a different situation, especially
when the plaintiff's claim is meritorious. Perhaps a clearly anticom-
petitive reason for bringing suit might be evidence of a more broad-
based violation; but seldom, if ever, should one suit be held within
the "sham" exception to Noerr.
Fortunately, a majority of the Court agrees. The concurring opin-
ion would require a pattern of claims or some other showing of
"grave abuse" before a violation is proved and pending state court
litigation could be enjoined. The plurality would seem to require the
same for violation before future state court litigation could be en-
joined. Thus, although Vendo taken as a whole may expand some-
what the Trucking Unlimited sham exception rule, the expansion
does not seem particularly worrisome.
VII. FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT II - THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
Without doubt, the area of antitrust law which has been in the
greatest flux during the past several years has been that of when the
"state action" doctrine 8' applies to exempt from illegality conduct
otherwise violative of the antitrust laws. Consider, for example, that
in each of the Court's last three terms, a decision involving proper
application of this doctrine has been announced."9 Moreover, the
on Noerr-Pennington grounds. See, e.g., Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist., [1977-
1] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,448 (7th Cir. May 26, 1977).
187. Trucking Unlimited, supra note 161, 404 U.S. at 514.
188. The doctrine is variously called the "state action defense," the "state action immun-
ity," the "state action exemption," and the "nonapplicability of antitrust laws" doctrine. For
convenience, it will be referred to here as the "state action exemption."
189. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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same issue will occupy the Court's time during its next term.19
Generally, the state action exemption doctrine provides that
where the challenged anticompetitive activity "derived its authority
and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was
not intended to operate or become effective without that com-
mand," the activity is protected from federal antitrust challenge. 9 ,
This statement, of course, is skeletal, and questions abound.
The basic conflict of policies which has caused the controversy is
clear. On the one hand, the Court has recognized that the Sherman
Act is the Magna Carta of economic freedom.'9 2 On the other, princi-
ples of federalism might dictate that the policies of the antitrust
laws give way to the state's judgment that competition is not the
"summum bonum"'' 3 in a given situation. It will be seen that the
Court has taken a middle ground.
After the Court's 1943 decision in the seminal case, Parker v.
Brown,'9 the state action exemption was not presented to the Court
again until 1962,'11 and then, in its 1975 Goldfarb decision.9" The
facts of Goldfarb are well known, and only a brief synopsis is neces-
sary here. Suit was brought against the Virginia State Bar, "the
190. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 97 S.Ct. 1577 (1977).
191. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943). The doctrine can be traced back to at least
1904 when the Court decided Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904). There, against both
constitutional and antitrust challenges, the right of Texas to confer a monopoly on pilots in
the port of Galveston was upheld. To hold the practice violative of the antitrust laws, the
Court said, would be tantamount to denying the right of Texas to regulate pilotage. "[Ilt
must follow that no monopoly or combination in a legal sense can arise from the fact that
the duly authorized agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon
them by law." 195 U.S. at 345.
In Parker, a suit against state officials, the Court held that Congress did not intend the
Sherman Act to restrain state or official action; the intent was to prohibit only certain
individual action. The Court was careful to caution, however, that the state cannot give
immunity to private persons by declaring their conduct lawful or by authorizing it. The
particular facts before it did not present a case where the state had become a participant in
a private combination in restraint of trade. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
192. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
193. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir.
1970).
194. See note 191 supra.
195. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
196. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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administrative agency through which the Virginia Supreme Court
regulates the practice of law," '197 and a private local bar association,
charging that the promulgation of a minimum fee schedule by the
private group, in conjunction with condonation and ethical opinions
in support thereof by the state bar, constituted a price fixing agree-
ment.
After holding that the challenged conduct constituted price fix-
ing, the Court considered whether the state bar's conduct was ex-
empt from challenge under the state action exemption. The
"threshold inquiry" was whether the "activity is state action of the
type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe," i.e., "whether
the activity is required by the State acting as sovereign." '198 Al-
though the Supreme Court of Virginia apparently had granted
power to the state bar to issue ethical opinions, no statute or court
rule "required the anticompetitive activities of either respon-
dent."'99 The challenged activity must be "compelled," not simply
prompted.
Noting that the state bar was a state agency for some limited
purposes, the Court held that it could not expect to be protected
when engaging in anticompetitive activity for its own members'
benefit. The state bar had "voluntarily joined in what is essentially
a private anticompetitive activity,""2 ' and therefore, could not claim
Parker v. Brown protection.
Goldfarb appeared to be a narrowing of the state action exemp-
tion, and although its ramifications were unclear, several general
principles appeared9 A state agency can violate the Sherman Act;
the challenged activity itself must have been mandated;"' a suffi-
197. 421 U.S. at 776 (footnote omitted).
198. Id. at 790.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 792.
201. Lower court decisions subsequent to Goldfarb, at least where some government entity
subordinate to the state raised the exemption, have interpreted the requirement more liber-
ally:
We read Goldfarb as holding that, absent state authority which demonstrates that
it is the intent of the state to restrain competition in a given area, Parker-type immun-
ity or exemption may not be extended to anticompetitive government activities. Such
an intent may be demonstrated by explicit language in state statutes, or may be
inferred from the nature of the powers and duties given to a particular government
entity.
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cient mandate may come from either the legislature or the judici-
ary;2"' and a state agency cannot expect to be protected if it joins
with private entities to effect the restraint. The major question left
unanswered was whether, if the conduct is compelled, any further
analysis is necessary, i.e., whether a command is both necessary
and sufficient to sustain the exemption. Unfortunately, because of
an intervening case between Goldfarb and this term's case, Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona,"' the answer still is not completely clear.
This intervening case, Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,24 is one of the
most confusing cases ever to come from the Court.
In Cantor, the Michigan Public Service Commission had ap-
proved a tariff provision by which Detroit Edison exchanged the
burnt-out light bulbs of its customers for new ones at no cost. 05 The
tariff had been drafted and submitted for approval by the utility;
no state law required it to furnish bulbs, 20 and the Court concluded
that Michigan had expressed no interest in regulating the market
for light bulbs. Cantor, a retailer who sold bulbs, sued the utility,
charging that the arrangement foreclosed him from selling light
bulbs in violation of the antitrust laws.
A plurality of the Court0 ' read Parker narrowly to apply only
where the state or some state official was sued.20 The Parker Court
Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1280 (3d Cir. 1975). Accord, City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S.Ct. 1577 (1977);
City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, [1976-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 60,999 (E.D. Va.
1976), rev'd, [1977-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,598 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 1977).
202. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, No. 76-629-A (E.D. Va. March 8, 1976). See City of
Lafayette, 532 F.2d at 434 n.7.
203. 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
204. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
205. The plurality, see note 207 infra, seemed particularly careful in its statement of facts
to emphasize that the tariff was "approved" by the commission. In Part I of the opinion, 428
U.S. at 582-85, "approval" or "approved" is used to describe the commission's action at least
six times. Nowhere is it said that the action was a command or mandate. Of course, even if
there were a mandate, it would have come not from the legislature or judiciary, but rather
from a subordinate state agency. If, however, there were no proper mandate, under Goldfarb
the analysis would stop. This is only one of many confusing aspects of the Cantor decision.
206. The utility was required, however, to continue the practice until a tariff not containing
the program was approved by the commission.
207. Stevens, Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.
208. Goldfarb teaches that state officials are not always protected. See notes 196-200 supra,
and accompanying text.
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had "carefully selected language which plainly limited the Court's
holding to official action taken by state officials. '2 9
Having determined that Parker was inapplicable, the plurality
had to decide whether some new doctrine related to the Parker
holding protected the utility. Two arguments might be made in
favor of protection: First, it would be "unfair" to hold a private
entity responsible where it did no more than obey a command of the
state. 210 Second, where a state is already regulating a certain prac-
tice, it can be argued that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws
to apply as a second, sometimes conflicting, regulatory scheme.
The majority"' rejected the first argument because the utility did
not simply follow a state command; it played an active role in
drafting and having the anticompetitive scheme approved. "[T]he
option to have, or not to have, such a program is primarily [the
utility's], not the Commission's.1 12 The second argument was re-
jected for three reasons: First, as a general principle, state regula-
tion and the antitrust laws do not always conflict. They can live
together in many factual settings. Second, even where there is a
conflict, the federal interest may be supreme.' Third, where the
market under scrutiny, such as light bulbs, is unregulated by the
state, then the antitrust laws should have full play.214
209. 428 U.S. at 591.
210. Id. at 592. This is not to say, however, that the practice could not be enjoined, and
such exemplifies a problem with the plurality's first conclusion, i.e., that Parker is applicable
or inapplicable depending on the status of the party sued. If a person desires to destroy the
state program, he simply sues a private party rather than the state. There is little logic to
this.
211. Id. at 594-95. The Chief Justice concurred in this portion of the plurality opinion. Id.
at 603. Thus, this part is the law of the case.
212. Id. at 594 (footnote omitted). A majority made crystal clear that simple "state author-
ization, approval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive private conduct confers no
antitrust immunity." Id. at 592-93 (footnote omitted).
213. Id. at 595. Some have suggested that a traditional preemption analysis is the proper
mode of determining when the state action exemption should apply. See, e.g., Note, Parker
v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L. J. 1164 (1975).
214. 428 U.S. at 595. The plurality (the Chief Justice did not concur) also emphasized that
because of Goldfarbs "threshold inquiry" language, it should not be inferred that compliance
by a private party with any state requirement will sustain the exemption. Id. at 600. This
statement can be interpreted in several ways. It may mean that there must be more than a
simple requirement, i.e., there must be an absolute command from some sovereign branch
of the state. On the other hand, it may mean that an absolute command may be necessary
but not sufficient. In light of Bates, where the Court did not go behind the command to
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The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the
result. The former, in a short and direct opinion, simply noted that
the state had no business approving tariffs which affected a market
which was normally not subject to regulation. Mr. Justice Black-
mun used a different analysis. First he held that the Sherman Act
"'generally preempts inconsistent state laws. ' ' 215 The more difficult
question was in what situations preemption occurs. He espoused a
"rule of reason" approach where, although "state sanctioned activi-
ties ' 216 would be presumptively valid, potential harms and benefits
would be weighed. Finding no justification for the light bulb ex-
change program, Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred.2 7
It is interesting that some members of the Court felt it necessary
to perform all types of gyrations to reach the desired result. Assum-
ing that the utility's program was not deserving of an exemption, it
would have been easy enough simply to find an insufficient com-
mand by the state; or, perhaps it could have been argued that the
regulation of the market for light bulbs by a subordinate state
agency had not been "contemplated" by any sovereign branch of
question its wisdom, the former interpretation is probably correct.
215. 428 U.S. at 605.
216. Id. at 609 (emphasis added).
217. Id. at 612-64. The dissent by Stewart, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., is the most lucid and
logical analysis in the decision whether one agrees with its result or not. Rejected was the
plurality's narrow interpretation of Parker that it applied only when state officials were sued
because such would "trivialize that case to the point of overruling it." Id. at 616 (footnote
omitted). The issue in Parker was whether the restraint was exempt from challenge; the
pivotal factor is whether the restraint, notwithstanding the status of the defendant, is the
result of state action. The "fairness test" was rejected because participation in the decision-
making process by private parties is protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See note
161 supra, Part VI.
The dissenters argued that Congress simply did not intend the antitrust laws to apply to
state action. As the scope of the commerce clause expanded, however, some doctrine had to
be invented to fulfill this intent. Parker v. Brown was the answer:
Parker's basic holding - that the Sherman Act did not intend to displace restraints
imposed by the State acting as sovereign - coincides with the expressed legislative
goal not to "invade the legislative authority of the several States. . . ." Goldfarb
clarified Parker by holding that private conduct, if it is to come within the state-action
exemption, must be not merely "prompted" but "compelled" by state action. Thus
refined, the doctrine performs the salutary function of isolating those areas of state
regulation where the State's sovereign interest is, by the State's own judgment, at its
strongest, and limits the exemption to those areas.
428 U.S. at 637.
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state government.2 18 In any event, the best that can be said of the
decision is that it is impossible to apply in factual situations other
than that in which it arose 9.21
The Court in Cantor again narrowed the scope of the state action
exemption; the question was how much. Although the rule of the
case is unclear, it appears that a majority of the Court held that
approval from some group subordinate to the legislature or judici-
ary, in and of itself, is not sufficient to sustain the exemption. In-
deed this is consistent with Goldfarb, where the "command," if any,
came from the state bar rather than the supreme court.
Although the Court's most recent venture into this area of the law
does not solve all the problems raised by the Cantor and Goldfarb
decisions, it does seem to express a clear rule in certain circumstan-
ces. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, -0 the Court unanimously held
that a disciplinary rule promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court
and enforced by the state bar, which prohibited certain attorney
advertising, was exempt from challenge under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. 22'
Bates claimed that the prohibition on advertising constituted a
price fixing agreement, per se illegal under section 1. The Arizona
Supreme Court disagreed, but held that even if such were the case,
the state action exemption applied. 22
The Court, in affirming this portion of the Arizona court's opin-
218. Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway and Park Dist., 11977-1] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
61,448 (7th Cir. May 26, 1977).
219. But see Litton Systems, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 539 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1976); Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., [1977-1] TRADE REo. REP. (CCH)
61,485, 71,884 (S.D. Tex. April 29, 1977) (similar facts).
See also Boddicker v. Arizona Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977); Surety Title Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F.Supp. 298 (E.D.Va. 1977), appeal docketed, No.
77-1703 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 1977) (not discussed herein because the Virginia State Bar is
represented by the Virginia Office of Attorney General, the writer's employer).
220. 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
221. Id. at 2696-98. The Court's discussion of Sherman Act applicability was a relatively
minor part of the opinion. By a five to four vote, the Court held that price advertising for
some relatively standardized legal services is protected by the first amendment.
222. Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976). Although the result is correct, the
reasoning was unsatisfactory: "The regulation of the State Bar by the Supreme Court is an
activity of the State of Arizona acting as sovereign and exempt by the very provisions of the
Sherman Act." 113 Ariz. at -, 555 P.2d at 643.
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ion, held that "Goldfarb and Cantor. . .are distinguishable, and
their reasoning supports our conclusion here." '223 Goldfarb was dis-
tinguished easily on the ground that the illegal activity there had
not been compelled by the state. In Bates, however, the restraint
was an "affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court," the
"ultimate body wielding the State's power over the practice of
law.' 2 4
Bates, however, argued that the case was more akin to Cantor. He
argued that the American Bar Association, from which the discipli-
nary rule came, was a private group analogous to the utility in
Cantor. The Arizona court, in approving the rule, played the part
of the public service commission. The Court, however, noted "that
the context in which Cantor arose is crucial. 2 5 Three factors in
Cantor were critically distinct from the case at bar: First, in Cantor
no public official or agency was sued; here, however, the Arizona
Supreme Court was the real party in interest. Second, in Cantor the
state had expressed no interest in regulating the market involved.
On the other hand, the activities of attorneys are of great interest
to the state and traditionally have been regulated. "Finally, the
light bulb program in Cantor was instigated by the utility with only
the acquiescence of the state regulatory commission."22 The disci-
plinary rule, according to the Court, showed the state's policy, i.e.,
advertising by attorneys is not in the public interest. Moreover, the
alleged restraint could be reexamined by the policymaker, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court; this weakened the argument that if the rule
were exempted from challenge, federal policy would be subordi-
nated to that of the state.22
223. 97 S.Ct. at 2696.
224. Id. at 2697. If the Court had stopped here, the law would be clear. A command from
a sovereign branch of government would be both necessary and sufficient for applicability of
the state action exemption. The analysis would stop.
225. Id. Does this mean that Cantor is an anomoly?
226. Id. at 2698. Is the Court's concern that there was no command, i.e., only
"acquiescence," or that any command there was came from the commission and not the
legislature? The former seems more probable; but if that is the case, why not simply cite
Goldfarb?
227. It is difficult to understand why this is so. There is no reason to expect that the
sovereign branches of the state will pay any more heed to federal antitrust policy than will a
state regulatory commission. The Court's argument would bear more credence if Cantor had
involved action by some self-regulating board. Surely someone could have appealed the
tainted tariff.
1977]
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Although Bates does not answer all questions which might arise
under the state action exemption, it does seem to bring the doc-
trine's narrowing to a screeching halt. It can be read as a bright line
case which holds that where there is a specific command by a sover-
eign branch of the state government, notwithstanding the wisdom
of the command, a state agency if acting within the perimeters of
the command is protected from antitrust liability. It appears from
Bates that the Court is not going to engage in substantive due pro-
cess analysis to determine if the exemption applies; under their first
amendment analysis, a majority of the Court determined that some
degree of attorney advertising was warranted. It would also seem
that the decision holds that the Sherman Act does not preempt
inconsistent state legislation. 228
There are, however, at least two questions which Bates does not
answer. First, what happens when private parties are sued and they
are acting pursuant to a command of the type found in Bates? For
example, if private attorneys had been sued, would the result have
been the same? Second, what happens to a state agency when it is
not acting within the command itself but is implementing the com-
mand in a reasonable manner. 29 With respect to the first question,
the fairness test of Cantor simply seems unworkable. With respect
to the second, we may see the Court determine "reasonableness"
itself or use the "contemplation" test which has been adopted by
lower courts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to disagree strenuously with the Court's results this
228. The argument and retort were couched in the following terms:
(Bates] also assert[s] that the interest embodied in the Sherman Act must prevail
over the state interest in regulating the bar.
• . .Our concern that federal policy is being unnecessarily and inappropriately sub-
ordinated to state policy is reduced in such a situation; we deem it significant that
the state policy is so clearly and affirmatively expressed and that the State's supervi-
sion is so active.
97 S.Ct. at 2697-98.
229. This is an especially important consideration to local governments which are usually
granted extremely general powers by the state. The question should be answered next term
in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 97 S.Ct. 1577 (1977).
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term except that in Illinois Brick; a blanket denial of recovery by
indirect purchasers simply cannot be justified. If the decision can-
not be reversed by Congress, the Court should examine this question
again after the decision's adverse effects on antitrust enforcement
become clear. By seemingly increasing the burden of proof in tie-in
cases and rejecting the per se rule in vertical restraints cases, the
Court is turning more and more to economics as the lodestar in
antitrust cases; and this is how it should be. To encourage, however,
more economic analysis and complexity in some areas but to deny
recovery for indirect purchasers for the very same reasons seems
inconsistent at best.
Although private plaintiffs were consistently unsuccessful, none
of the decisions this term will have significant effects on government
enforcement of the antitrust laws, with the exception of government
attempts to recover damages for itself and perhaps, in parens
patriae actions, where states attempt to recover for their citizens.
There will be a strong move in Congress to reverse the case, and even
if this is unsuccessful, it is not clear that the Court's interpretation
of section 4 is applicable to section 4C.
The ramifications of the decisions obviously will be felt by private
litigants, those "private attorneys general" who are depended upon
so heavily to supplement the government's antitrust enforcement
efforts. If, however, the doors have been closed to some extent on
private litigants and incentives to sue have been lessened, those who
would engage in illegal conduct should take little solace. A number
of "sleeping giants" are now awakening. Indeed, in the years to
come it may be that the states became a primary factor in the
nation's overall efforts to assure a competitive marketplace.
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